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I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred years ago, English' and United States law were united in
their endorsement of the vested rights theory as the basis for resolving
choice of law problems. Joseph Story and later Joseph Beale in the United
States, 2 and A.V. Dicey in England3 dominated scholarly endeavor in that
area. Today, despite massive differences in paths, both systems still have at
least one thing in common: their analytical methods for examining tort
choice of law problems are as uncertain as they are dysfunctional. Until
very recently, English law suffered the fate of Sisyphus, pushing the twin
boulders of doctrinal characterization and the rule in Phillips v. Eyre4 up a
forsaken hill in an intellectually frozen Tartarus. Whether or not recent
changes have liberated it from that fate remains to be seen.5 American law
had to confront the specter of interest analysis, which is very far from being
exorcised, perhaps because6 a theory has not yet emerged with the weight
and substance to replace it.
' When we refer to "English" law, we include Australian law. There are comparatively
few differences, although these are sometimes significant. They are noted where relevant.
2 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed. 1857); JOSEPH
H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935). Beale was, of course, the chief
reporter for the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
3 See A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1896).
4 6 L.R.-Q.B. 1 (1870).
5England seems now to have abolished Phillipsv. Eyre in favor of a presumptive application of the lex loci delicti.See infratext accompanying note 79.
6 The historic

account of interest analysis is BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
182 (1963). See also Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in
Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927 (1975); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6.3, 6.32 (2d ed. 1980). In the last two decades, the theory has come under heavy attack. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis
and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392 (1980) [hereinafter Brilmayer, InCONFLICT OF LAWS

terest Analysis]; Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness,and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277
(1989) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Rights]; Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict ofLaws: A Critique of
InterestAnalysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1984).
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Perhaps the most troublesome of all choice of law questions arises
when a plaintiff asserts a cause of action for injuries arising from a contractual exchange entered in a market situation. This description embraces
some of the most important case types in modem litigation: products liability, securities litigation, industrial accidents, medical negligence, and so
on. Outside of private international law cases, these have represented the
battlefields of recent tort "crises" and subsequent reforms. 7 We shall refer
to these cases as "market torts". They represent the principal subject of
analysis in this work.
It does not take much effort to understand why these tort cases may be
the most problematic of all. The antique English approach struggles with
the arid question of characterizing the legal issue at stake, which precedes8
the selection of the choice of law rule: is it a contract case or a tort case?
Contract and tort choice of law rules are very different and rest on different
premises. 9 Thus, a disjunctive choice between them favors one set of
premises, and dismisses the other. The use of doctrinal analyses to solve
these problems does not make one confident of the consequential merits of
the solution. By contrast, an U.S.-style interest analysis is compromised by
market torts. Markets, by their nature, coordinate the movement of factors
of production to high-valuing uses; the more efficient the market, the
greater the potential movements and interactions between a range of jurisdictions. In these cases, many places may have an "interest" in the tort; this
in turn makes the ultimate law of the cause unclear. Add to these conceptual problems the fact that both methods implicitly favor forum law, and
one has a prescription for indeterminacy, unjust application of laws, and inefficient forum shopping.' 0
This essay is not simply the latest in a long line of articles articulating
a particular analysis or rule as the basis for determining the law of tort
causes. It does, inevitably, recommend an approach. But the specific rules
are not the most important part of the paper. Instead, we use law and economics scholarship to clarify the significance of choice of law in market

7

See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 1 (1987);
PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT (1993).

$See WALTER

WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF

LAWS ch. 8 (1949); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 71-74

(1993). See infra Part II.C.3(d).
9
See infra Part II.
10 As to forum favoritism in the United States, see JUENGER, supra note 8, at 101-03. The
lexfort was always an express, and often the dominant, part of the rule in Phillipsv. Eyre, 6
L.R.-Q.B. at 28-29 (1870). Phillipsv. Eyre remains applicable law in Australia. See McKain
v. RW Miller & Co. (S.A.) Pty. Ltd., (1991) 174 C.L.R. 1; Stevens v. Head, (1993) 176
C.L.R. 433. Despite the recent amendment of English law, there is still scope for a judge to
apply forum law. See infra text accompanying notes 73-79.
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torts, and to establish a framework in which one can evaluate different
analytical approaches to resolving choice of law problems.
Our starting point is to recognize that market torts involve contract issues and tort issues. The specific rights pleaded by the defendant are associated with tort as a corpus of law, but they also define the property rights
that are traded between contracting parties. Thus, the choice of law rules
applicable to market torts can be analyzed in terms of how they affect the
underlying contracting process. For instance, suitable rules will facilitate
the formation of markets, the pricing of goods, and the making of rational
choices by consumers and producers. We first demonstrate that tort choice
of law rules, both English and U.S., fail by this standard. Their ex ante indeterminacy deprives consumers of the ability to make rational choices, and
so complicates pricing and market formation.
Since tort choice of law rules are dysfunctional, can contract choice of
law methods offer anything better? For at least three decades now, the distinguishing feature of contract choice of law is the reliance, in the first instance, on party choice.1 ' If there is no choice, or if the law will not enforce
a choice, the law falls back to various background rules. These have typically referred the law of the cause to the legal system with the closest connection to the contract. Sometimes, as in the Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual12 Obligations, the law makes use of presumptions
which assist this inquiry.
The contract choice of law method suggests two important analogies.
First, the relation between a choice-based rule and a subsidiary background
rule is much the same as the relation between express contract terms and
default rules that has been central to the economic analysis of contract
law.' 3 We use insights from this fertile literature to examine, first, the circumstances in which permitting the parties to make an effective choice is
likely to be an appropriate solution. Although lawyers and scholars have a
phobia about the enforcement of terms in standard forms (which will characterize many, although not all market torts), enforcing party choices may
" See infra Part II.
'2CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS,

1980 O.J. L266/1 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
art. 4(2),
3

June

19,

1980

' See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic
Theory of Default Rules,.99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling
Gaps]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Strategic
ContractualInefficiency]; Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Jason Scott Johnston,
Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J.
615 (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101-15 (5th ed. 1998); Alan
Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and
JudicialStrategies,21 J.LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).
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be the best approach.14 Its persuasiveness depends on the costs of information about the choice, the nature of risks, and the efficiency of the market.
The rules that should apply where a choice of law does not exist is a
question about the optimal form of default rules. This question can be answered with reference not only to the scholarship of contract default rules,
but to the second analogous literature: the economics of adjudication by
rules and standards.' 5 A choice of law rule is the product of what Cass
Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit describe as a second-orderdecision.16
A strategy used in order to avoid the need to confront a decision-making
situation is a second-order strategy; the choice of such a strategy is a second-order decision. Thus, choice of law rules avoid the need for a judge to
choose a rule on the basis of a direct comparison, according to some costbenefit calculus and the facts of the particular case.' 7 Instead, a choice of
law rule provides a means to avoid the need for such comparison, by permitting the matter to be resolved according to the approach embodied in the
second-order choice of law rule. Thus, choice of law rules can be differentiated according to whether or not the second-order choice of law rule takes
a simple, low-cost formulation, and whether or not that rule permits the
eventual first-order adjudication (wherein the law of the cause is selected)
to be simple and low-cost. We show how choice of law methods can usefully be described by this taxonomy, and how, with the benefit of the economic literature on rules and standards, we might choose between and give
content to these approaches.
4
1 The

classic article is Friedrich Kessler, ContractsofAdhesion - Some Thoughts About

Freedom of Contract, 43 COLuM. L. REv. 629 (1943). See also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contractsin the Conflict ofLaws, 53 COLuM. L. REv. 1072 (1953). But cf George L.
Priest, A Theory ofthe Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981).
1'5 See Ian Ayres, PreliminaryThoughts on Optimal Tailoringof ContractualRules, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1 (1993); Colin S. Diver, The OptimalPrecision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Rulemaking 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial
Competence and the Interpretationof Incomplete Contracts,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994);
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);
POSNER, supra note 13, at 42-53; Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus
Standards, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995); Carol M. Rose, Crystalsand Mud in Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEcon-

omy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. Rav. 595 (1995). Law and economics is of
course not the only paradigm to consider rules and standards. The area has been much analyzed from jurisprudential perspectives. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules,
35 U. CHl. L. REv. 14 (1967); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adju-

dication,
89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
6
1 Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ulmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, Chicago
Working Papers in Law & Economics (2nd) No. 57, 2-3 (June, 1998).
17However, such a choice of law method has, on occasion, been urged. See JUENGER, SUpra note 8, at 195; Robert A. Leflar, Choice-InfluencingConsiderationsin Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966) (advocating a "better law" approach).
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One of the features of our analysis which we emphasize is that the selection of market tort choice of law rules needs to take into consideration
the nature of the transactions it applies to. The likelihood of dysfunctional
choice of law rules is greater, we think, the more generic the rule's formulation. Therefore, we lean towards a relatively complex, (higher-cost) second order choice of law rule, complemented by a simple adjudication. This
feature makes our analysis decidedly transactional; we embrace this feature
illustratively by examining and contrasting products liability cases and securities litigation cases. These are different transactions with different market features, and warrant different choice of law rules. For example, the
case for enforcing party choices is much stronger in securities litigation
than it is in products liability, because information costs are much lower,
markets more efficient, and the traded commodity much more standardized
and fungible.
The structure of the article is as follows. Part II is the theoretical core
of the article. It discusses the economic significance of choice of law rules.
It provides a comparative analysis of English and United States tort methods. Using economic analysis, we can see how unsuitable tort choice of
law rules are to market torts. With these conclusions in mind, Part II develops a framework, based on the Sunstein-Ullman-Margalit analysis and the
economic literature, for analyzing different choice of law methods that can
be applied to market tort cases. Part Ill uses the theory and analysis of Part
H to examine three specific questions: (1) Should express choices of tort
law be permitted? (2) If a choice of law is permitted, but no choice is made,
what form should the default choice of law method take? (3) If a choice of
law is not permitted, because rational choices are unlikely, what form
should the mandatory choice of law method take? Part IV uses the choice
of law approach established in Part I to show how two specific market
torts, products liability and securities litigation, should be analyzed. We
come to different conclusions regarding the appropriate form of choice of
law method for each tort type, so endorsing our transactional approach.
Part V is a conclusion.
II. CHOICE OF LAW RULES: THEORETICAL FUNCTIONS
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Part II of this article is an essentially critical look at the legal theory
and doctrinal content of choice of law rules, with reference to market torts.
This part concentrates first on general theoretical issues, and then turns to
comparative analysis of these problems at the practical, doctrinal level in
English, Australian, and United States law. In order to do this, section II.A
prepares the way by a brief expository account of the economic analysis of
tort law. An understanding of this theory assists us in examining the significance of choice of law rules and in evaluating the present and possible
alternative choice of law methods. Section B takes up the question of the
economic significance of choice of law rules. It shows that in contract and
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market tort cases, choice of law rules play an important part in the definition of property rights between contracting parties. Section C then provides
a general treatment of the suitability of choice of law rules to market torts,
as a platform for the analysis in part H.
A. The Economics of Tort Law
Economic analysis of tort law examines the relation between tort rules
and accident costs, and the manner in which tort rules allocate accident
costs between tortfeasors and victims. 8 If social and private costs were always equal, parties would only engage in injury-causing behavior if the
marginal social benefit exceeded its marginal social costs. In the absence of
legal intervention, some or all of the social costs of injury causing behavior
will not be borne by the tortfeasor. The apparent result is too much injurycausing behavior. The great insight of law and economics, first discovered
by, and named after, Nobel Laureate R.H. Coase, was that efficiency would
nonetheless prevail if tortfeasor and victim could contract with each other,
in relation to care and accident prevention, at no cost.' 9
The Coase theorem demonstrates that this result would hold irrespective of the existence or form of tort laws. Even in the absence of legal protection, a victim would be prepared to pay up to the amount of the expected
private cost of the injury to compel the tortfeasor to take care. If the expected cost of the injury exceeded the tortfeasor's gain from the action which is the efficiency condition for taking care - both parties would be
better off entering a contract obliging the victim to pay the tortfeasor to take
care. Efficiency is therefore independent of prior allocations of property
rights in a zero transaction cost world.20 Coase recognized that tort rules
8

1 Comprehensive accounts of the theory are provided in WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) and STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). Obviously, use of efficiency as
the touchstone of choice of law rules is controversial, both in terms of its suitability to normative analysis of law generally and its relevance to private international law: See Brilmayer, Rights, supra note 6 (criticizing consequentialism in private international law
scholarship); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUDIES 191 (1980) (criticizing wealth maximization as a basis for analysis of legal rules). On the other hand, a
prominent advocate of corrective justice as the proper object of tort law has regarded efficiency as a defensible objective in products liability, the most important of market torts.
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 407-29 (1992).

Also, the choice of law rules we

advocate for market torts are consistent with Brilmayer's emphasis on a defendant's political
rights see Rights, supra note 6, at 1307-08, because they preserve a defendant's right to exit
a regime imposing particular laws.
19 R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. I (1960).
20
The allocation nonetheless has implications for the distribution of wealth between the
parties. Distributive unfairness can, however, be corrected by redistribution (e.g., taxes).
See Richard Craswell, PassingOn the Costs ofLegal Rules: Efficiency and Distributionin
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10, 119-27 (2nd ed. 1989); Stewart J. Schwab,
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may be needed for efficient investments in accident precautions where
transaction costs are positive. Parties may not enter the sorts of bargains
possible where contracting is costless. Ideally, tort rules would allocate
risks in a way that emulated the bargain that would be entered in a world of
costless transacting.
Later scholars examined the use of tort liability rules as a means by
which the law caused tortfeasors to internalize the costs of accidents and to
take efficient precautions. 2' This work recognized the difference between
legal rules in contracts and torts cases. Although it would be impossible
for, say, a pedestrian to contract with every motorist, many "torts" cases,
including products liability and professional negligence, are situated within
exchange contexts. 22 In these cases, transaction costs may prevent consumers and providers wringing out the very last gains from trade. However,
provided consumers perceive the risks of harm associated with the exchange, they will be willing to pay for precautions that reduce those risks.
In well-functioning markets, providers will be correspondingly prepared to
invest in those precautions. Contracts, such as warranties, are a means by
which the provider credibly signals that those investments have been made.
Tort law is also important in these contract-based tort cases because, in
addition to its capacity to encourage efficient investments in care where
contracting is costly, it allocates accident costs between providers and consumers. 23 If care is costly, there will always be accidents, as some accidents
cannot be efficiently prevented. Tort laws determine who bears the costs of
these accidents. The great revolution of the second half of the century has
been the gradual allocation of most losses to providers through substantially
changed tort laws embracing strict liability. This allocation is sometimes
described as enterprise liability, the effect of which is to require the provider to supply the product with an implicit insurance policy covering
losses that reasonable care would not avoid.24 The supposed merits of enterprise liability include the fact that it would assist the poor, who would be
Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and EconomistsDo Not, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1171,
1195-96 (1989); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. DistributionalEquity in Legal
Rule-making: Should DistributionalEquity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71
AM. ECON. REv. 414 (1981).

21 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melarned, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); LANDES & POSNER,
note 18.
supra
22
Shavell, supra note 18, at 51-64.
23
See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1537 (1987).

24See generally ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG,

NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951);

VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING

TORT REFORM FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995); George L. Priest, Strict Products

Liability: The OriginalIntent, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2301, 2301 (1989).
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unable to insure otherwise. The cost of the extra insurance would be passed
through to all consumers in prices.
Although enterprise liability has merits if liability is appropriately defined, it has been shown to create potentially severe problems. Any form
of insurance, whether first-party or tort-based third-party insurance, relies
on the ability of the insurer - the provider in the case of enteTrise liability
It is much
to segregate insureds into narrowly defined risk classes.
harder in general for a manufacturer to segregate risks, since it typically
must sell to anyone prepared to pay the price. This makes the risk pool a
heterogeneous one. George Priest also demonstrates that the award of substantial damages for non-pecuniary loss, for which first-party insurance
markets have never formed, and the lack of controls on losses after an accident, further increase the variance and heterogeneity of the risk-pools. As
the variance of risk pools rise, prices increase substantially. Over time the
market may unravel, because lower risks progressively find they are paying
too much for their coverage.27 If the law permits it, contract may serve a
role in responding to this problem. By changing the scope of liability exclusions, it can reduce risk pool variance and hence prices.
With this understanding of the economic analysis of tort law, and its
relation to contract law in mind, we can now turn to examine the economic
function and significance of choice of law rules.
B. The Economic Significance of Choice of Law
Start with an easy question: are choice of law rules significant in a
world of zero transaction costs? No. The parties will exploit all possible
efficiency gains by contract, and allocate unpreventable losses to the lower
cost bearer. To do that, the contract would be contingently complete; that
is, it would specify actions and payoffs for all possible future states of the
world.29 The only possible role for choice of law would be in matters of
interpretation and enforcement. In the real world, however, where contracts
25Priest, supra note 7; Priest, supra note 23. The analysis below draws substantially
from
Priest's analysis.
2
6Priest, supra note 23.
27George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
(1970) 84 Q.J. ECON. 488.
Mechanism,
28

Altematively, the extent of tort liability may be reduced, so that extensions beyond that
point are left to contract. Tort reforms in the United States have mostly favored this option.
For analysis of these reforms, see Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The
1980s Tort Crisisand the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 218-23 (1990). For
theoretical analysis and critique, compare Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in
Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2193 (1989) and RuBIN, supra note 7, with
Mark Geistfeld, The PoliticalEconomy of NeocontractualProposalsfor Products Liability
Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803 (1994) and Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed
Promise
of Neocontract,74 MINN. L. Rav. 1177 (1990).
29
Ayres & Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency, supra note 13, at 730.
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are either nonexistent or incomplete, choice of law rules have important
substantive functions. To consider what these are, we first move incrementally away from a world of zero transaction costs to a world in which
transaction costs are not zero, but they do not preclude contracting between
the parties. We then creep up the transaction cost scale incrementally, by
looking first at market torts where contracts do, by our definition, exist, but
where the definition of the property rights traded between the parties is
drawn from tort law. To close this section, and as a means of completing
the larger picture, we then look at non-market torts where transaction costs
overwhelm any gains from trade.
1. Contracts Cases
The role of choice of law rules in contract depends on our conception
of the general functions of contract law. Economists generally take the
view that contract law supplements contracts with terms that contracting
parties want, but which they will omit from their agreements because negotiation is costly, and therefore limited. The law facilitates the contracting
process by filling gaps in agreements in suitable ways. Implicit in this
view is a premise that contract law should not override party agreement.
This assumption of consumer sovereignty or contractual freedom requires
contract law rules to take default form that parties may agree to exclude.
Likewise, the rules that establish the proper law of the contract should have
two features. First, they should reinforce, not thwart, what the parties have
agreed. Second, they should fill the gaps the parties have left with terms
from a system of contract law in a way that decreases transaction costs.
It is worth foreshadowing at this point that the means by which the law
should fulfill the second of these imperatives is not immediately apparent.
The first imperative is simple enough, as it implies the parties should have
substantial autonomy to make contractual choices of law, and that where
they have not done so, the validation of express agreement should be a
weighty factor in choosing between competing legal systems. 3' But what is
the optimal choice of law default? The literature on defaults in contract is
remarkably variable, as different considerations affect the choice. We synthesize this literature with other relevant literature in part I of this paper.
It is worth noting that although there are a substantially larger number of
possibilities, the default rule literature implies that there are two choice of
law methods most likely to satisfy an efficiency objective. One is a casespecific attempt to select the law of the cause based on a consideration of
the legal rules parties are most likely to choose, had they the opportunity to
30

For principal references on the law's gap-filling function, see supra text accompanying
note3113.
In Part IV, we consider whether there are persuasive reasons not to enforce the parties'
choice. See also infra Part III.A.2(a).
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bargain. This involves consultation with a hypothetical bargain the parties
might have entered, known as a tailoreddefault.32
The alternative is to use a more generally applicable gap-filling method
that reflects the preferences of a majority of similar contracting parties.
This sort of choice of law method would shift focus from ex post tailoring
to ex ante rule-setting. The primary, object of this approach is to provide
default law choices that are clear at the time of contracting, which should
facilitate party choices, and hence, market formation. This form of default
33
can be described as untailored.
2. Market Tort Cases

We can extend this analysis of choice of contract law to cases where
injury arises from the performance of a contract; that is, a market tort. We
saw in section II.A that contracts have real value in tort cases. They permit
providers to signal consumers that valuable investments in care have been
made. They also provide a means by which parties can agree to redistribute
the risks that each bears, since there are reasons to believe that third-party
liability under tort rules may sometimes be inefficient insurance arrangements. If this is so, choice of law rules should, as in contract cases, not select laws that would thwart or stultify the parties' express contractual
agreement regarding compensation, product insurance and safety precautions. Of course, specifying a contingently complete contract is almost impossible when dealing with a manufacturer's acceptable safety precautions.
Hence, we do not observe contracts that use terms obliging the manufacturer to take all measures that cost no more than the expected harm, because
they would be immensely difficult for a court to interpret or enforce.34
Neither do we observe contracts that predicate on specific actions taken in
product design or manufacture, because these may often be unobservable.
On the other hand, there are many express terms in the forms of warranties
and exclusions. Unless a commitment to consumer sovereignty is inefficient in the case of market torts, choices of law should validate and enforce
these express terms.
Second, the choice of law method will also be responsible for selecting
the basic tort liability rules applicable to the contracts in question. This is a
substantially similar problem to the selection of gap-filling rules in contract
32

Ayres & Gertner, FillingGaps, supra note 13, at 91-2.
Id. In an earlier work, we compared tailored and untailored choice of law defaults, as
they apply to contract cases: Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, Putting the "Private" Back
Into PrivateInternationalLaw: Default Rules and the ProperLaw of the Contract,21 MELB.
U. L. REv. 515, 535 (1997) [hereinafter Whincop & Keyes, Proper Law of the Contract].
Not simply because we are considering a different subject here, our views on the subject of
tailoring
have changed somewhat from those expressed there.
34
Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor ProductsLiability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
YALE L.J. 353,367-68 (1988).
33
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cases. However, the "gap-filling" tort rules are less likely to be defaults
than those rules conventionally associated with the corpus of contract law.
Again, it is not immediately apparent whether the method used to select tort
rules should operate on a tailored, case-by-case basis, or an untailored, rulelike basis.
3. Non-market Tort Cases
there
are no contractual or exchange relations between
In cases where
the plaintiff and defendant, the economic analysis of choice of law becomes
quite different.35 It is obvious that the notion of upholding contracts has no
relevance to non-market torts. It is a basic premise of economic analysis
that the effect of tort rules on accident precautions by tortfeasors and victims depends on the deterrent effect of the liability.3 6 Different legal rules
may have different deterrent probabilities. It may seem to follow that
choice of law rules should select the laws that most efficiently deter negli37
gent behavior. However, we have argued that this is likely to be incorrect.
Choice of law would have this effect only where the parties could have
some expectation that they would be subject to a different liability rule than
the one applied to cases that do not involve multistate elements. It seems
very likely that non-market torts only occasionally involve multistate elements, and the fact that a case has multistate elements is only apparent after
parties make investments in care. If these conditions hold, as they probably
do in most automobile accidents or running-down cases, the ex post selection of a more efficient law is not likely to have any efficiency effects.38
Thus, choice of law probably has no effect on accident precautions. We argue that a choice of law rule applicable to non-market torts should do two
things. First, it should minimize the variation of judgments between forums, in order to minimize forum shopping and the costs of litigation. Second, the rule should permit parties to ascertain what liability rules will
apply to their conduct, in order to permit them to make decisions regarding
their level of injury-causing activity, and the extent to which they should
purchase insurance.
C. The Suitability of Choice of Law Rules to Market Torts
Now that we understand the economic significance of choice of law
rules across the full contract-tort spectrum and understand the ways in
which economics suggests these rules should operate, we can examine the
35This section draws substantially on our article on non-market torts, Michael Whincop
& Mary Keyes, Economic Analysis of Conflict of Laws in Torts Cases: Discrete and RelaTorts, 22 MELB. U. L. REv. 370 (1998) [hereinafter Whincop & Keyes, Torts].
tional
36

See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 5-18.
See Whincop & Keyes, Torts, supra note 35.
38
it may affect the distribution of wealth between the parties, because different liability
rules affect the size of any judgment.
37
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choice of law methods which might be suited, or which might not be suited,
to the efficient resolution of multistate market torts. Because market torts
involve the application of tort rules to contract cases, it is useful to think
first about the proper forms of contract choice of law rules and then about
tort choice of law rules.
1. Contract Choice of Law Method
We have said that a contract choice of law rule should, first and foremost, uphold the parties' agreement and permit the parties substantial
autonomy to make their own choices of law. English, Australian, and U.S.
law give very substantial freedom to the parties to choose the proper law of
the contract, which is typically done by way of a choice of law clause.39
There are, however, some limits on contractual choices of law. English law
professes to limit the enforcement of contractual choices of law to those
which are "bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding
the choice on the ground of public policy."40 These qualifications are rarely
invoked, though both English and Australian courts have on occasion refused to enforce a choice of law that would avoid a statutory rule.4' However, this unwillingness has arisen only with respect to mandatory rules of
theforum, not those of other jurisdictions.4 2
United States law's limits on contractual choice are somewhat more
43
expansive, perhaps a holdover effect of that country's historical antipathy.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS provides that the
contractual choice should not be enforced if:

39

See, e.g., Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., 1939 App. Cas. 277, 290;
Akai Pty. Ltd. v. The People's Ins. Co. Ltd., (1996) 188 C.L.R. 418; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 187 (1971).
40
See Vita Food Products, 1939 App. Cas. at 290. As to bona fide choices, see Golden

Acres Ltd. v. Queensland Estates Pty. Ltd., 1969 Qd. R. 378.

41See Akai, 188 C.L.R. 418; The Hollandia, [1982] 3 All E.R. 1141 (H.L.). See generally
J. J. Fawcett, Evasion of Law and Mandatory Rules in Private International Law, 49
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 44 (1990). But see Michael J. Whincop & Mary E. Keyes, Statutes' Domains in PrivateInternationalLaw: An Economic Theory of the Limits of MandatoryRules,
20 SYDNEY L. REv. 435 (1998) [hereinafter Whincop & Keyes, Statutes].
42 Vita Foods is an example, as are the English proceedings in Akai Pty. Ltd. v. People's

Ins. Co. Ltd., [1998] 1Lloyd's Rep. 90 (Q.B.). England has refused to adopt article 7 of the
ROME CONVENTION, which permits the giving of effect to foreign mandatory rules.
CONTRACTS
(APPLICABLE LAW) ACT (U.K.), §2(2) (1990).
43
See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 332.2 (1935). An alternative economic explanation is that choice of law clauses provide a low-cost means of exiting state
regulation. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism, Efficiency and Com-

petition (Nov. 16, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). It may be that states
within a federation such as the United States have a stronger interest in constraining exit than
a unitary state does, as constraining exit provides greater coverage for state regulation. On

the other hand, Australia is also a federation of states, yet it embraced the English rules.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

19:215 (1999)

(i) there was no effective choice by the parties;44
(ii) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties and
there is no reasonable basis for the choice; 4 or
(iii) application of the choice of law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state with a materially greater interest whose
law would apply in the absence of the choice.4 6
Provided that the first qualification does not interfere with the enforcement of standard form contracts simply because they are not negotiated, neither it nor the second qualification is likely to create major
inefficiencies. The third qualification is more expansive than the AngloAustralian approach, which is limited to local mandatory rules.47 This third
qualification presents somewhat more of a problem. First, it invokes the
concept of state interests, which are often vague and indeterminate. The
existence and relative significance of state interests can only be resolved on
an ex post basis, which is fatal to certainty at the time of contracting. Second, state interests may be inimical to efficiency. Laws may service the
demand of private interest groups active in the political process, at the expense of contracting parties generally.48 If interest group legislation fails
the (weak-form) criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,49 the elevation of
state interests above party autonomy will have substantial social costs. It is
worth noting that this so-called public policy exception really has but one
effect: it increases the costs of exiting from a state's regulation, since it
suggests that contracting parties with closer substantive connections to a
state are more likely to be able to enforce their preferred laws.50 In general,
the weaker position of mandatory rules in English law is preferable to the
position in the United States.
English and U.S. law also proceed in a similar fashion in the absence
of a choice of law. When the vested rights school was at its zenith, both
English and U.S. law tended to rely on rule-like choice of law methods
which referred the problem to the law of the place of contracting and the

44RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
4

51d. § 187(2).

46

1d.

47 See Robert A. Sedler, A Real World Perspective On Choice Of Law, 48 MERCER L.

REv.
781, 803-04 (1997).
48
Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 43.
49
That is, the winner's gains exceed the loser's losses sufficiently to permit, in theory,
compensation of the latter by the former. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 523 ("Although the correlation is far from perfect, ... [rules] made by the legislature tend to be efficiency-reducing."). But cf. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups
for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983).
5
°See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. f (1971).
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law of the place at which the contractual obligations would be performed. 5'
These methods are similar to untailored defaults, which apply in a generic
and (in theory) determinate manner. Over time, and with the benefit of realist critiques,5 2 presumptive and rule-based methods fell out of favor.
Their place in both England and Australia was taken by a choice of law
method which ascertains the jurisdiction which has the "closest and most
real connection," or the "most significant relationship" to the contract.53
In section 1.B we referred to the possibility of tailored choices of law.
Tailored defaults are ascertained ex post, perhaps according to standards
such as "reasonableness." The most significant relationship test is a species
of tailoring. However, it is best to regard it as only a semi-strong form of
tailoring. It only seeks to choose the most closely connected jurisdiction. It
does not ask the further question of which set of substantive rules would the
parties have preferred had they been able to negotiate a choice of law
clause. So far as we are aware, no legal system actually adopts such a
method. However, its fingerprints are discernible in cases where the court
has resolved a choice of law issue in a way which is most likely to uphold
the parties' bargain.54
There is a significant difference between the semi-strong and strong
forms of tailoring. The crucial difference is that the former concerns itself
with a jurisdiction-based choice on grounds that may not emphasize party
interests.55 The latter would counsel the judge to select between rules according to a judgment about their relative appeal to the parties at the time of
the contract. It may be that this difference reflects the fact that the calculus
of semi-strong tailoring is more reliant on state interests than it is on party
interests. A "most significant relationship" criterion ignores the possibility
that there may not be a high correlation between the laws that maximize the
welfare of parties and the jurisdictions with contracts are most closely con51
See, e.g., Lloyd v. Guibert, (1865) 1 L.R.-Q.B. 115; Merwin Pastoral Co. Pty. Ltd. v.
Moolpa Pastoral Co. Pty. Ltd., (1933) 48 C.L.R. 565; The Assunzione, 1954 P 150, 176 (P.
Div'l Ct. 1954); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 358 (1934); EDWARD
I. SYKES & MICHAEL C. PRYLES, AUSTRALIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

607-08 (3rd ed.

1991).
52
See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws, 31 ILL. L. REV.
1435 3(1936).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971). See ROME
CONVENTION, art 4(1); Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia, 1951 App. Cas. 219 (appeal taken from Austl.); Akai Pty. Ltd. v. The People's Ins. Co. Ltd., (1996) 188 C.L.R. 418,
440-42.
See Coast Lines Ltd. v. Hudig & Veder Chartering N.V., [1972] 2 Q.B. 34, 44; Seeman
v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 407-08 (1927); Peter E. Nygh, The Reasonable Expectations of the Partiesas a Guide to Choice of Law in Contractand in Tort, 251
RECUEIL DES CouPs 268, 340-46 (1995); ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 174 (1962).
55
- David F. Cavers, A Critiqueofthe Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 194

(1933).
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nected. This may be because contracts may be primarily connected with a
jurisdiction with an undeveloped legal system, 56 or because some jurisdictions create unsuitable or inefficient laws. On the other hand, semi-strong
tailoring may be preferable if the greater adjudicatory discretion inherent in
a rule-selection process is used for spurious objectives, such as protection
of local citizens, or the externalization of costs on out-of-state fi-ms.
The purpose of this article is to contribute both to the scholarship of
choice of law and the analysis of alternative methods - such as tailored
and untailored choices of law. It is possible, of course, to proceed straight
to an economic analysis. However, before we do that, we want to provide a
framework in which these comparisons can be made. Ideally, that framework should not itself be a product of economic analysis, since those rejecting such analyses will reject the framework, and so deprive scholars
from competing traditions of a common starting point. To establish such a
framework, we borrow from Professors Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit's
recent work on second-order decisions. 7 The premise of their analysis is
that much decision-making does not proceed according to the classical
paradigm of comparing costs and benefits, because of the substantial costs
of doing so, limited data, and the bounded rationality of some individuals,
amongst other reasons. Accordingly, people make second-order decisions,
which are particular forms of strategy by which to minimize the burdens
and risks of error in the making of the basic first-order decision.58
Choice of law problems are a form of decision. Conflicts cases by
definition raise an issue for decision: what legal rule must be chosen? Unless one believes, and we doubt anyone now does, that there is an answer to
a choice of law question, the validity of which is always apodictic, then it
follows that a decision, without an obvious answer, must be made. Likewise, many scholars will agree that the decision, or, at least, the way in
which such decisions as these are made, should be defensible in consequential terms. 59 The calculus of consequence will differ from theory to
theory, but the notion of optimizing some sort of objective function is
common to all of these approaches. A choice of law rule requires that the
law of the cause be selected to conform with some previously identified
method. Thus, committing to a choice of law method is a second-order decision.
Professors Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit describe eight possible
strategies for resolving a second order decision: rules, presumptions, stan56

57
5

See, e.g., Amin Rasheed Corp. v. Kuwait Ins. Co., 1984 App. Cas. 50, 63 (H.L.).
Sunstein & Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 16.

11d. at 3.

59

See Brilmayer, Rights, supra note 6, at 1284-91 (discussing and critiquing consequentialism in conflicts scholarship). Naturally, a law and economics approach is consequential
in nature.
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60
dards, routines, small steps, picking, delegation, and heuristics. It is possible to compare these strategies across two dimensions: (1) to what extent
does a strategy minimize costs ex ante at the time the second order decision
is made (i.e., when the choice of law rule is formulated) and (2) to what
extent does a strategy minimize costs ex post at the time of the eventual
first order decision (i.e., when the judge decides the choice of law problem). 61 Some will have low ex ante costs but high ex post costs (low-high);
some will be the opposite (high-low). A few may minimize costs at both
levels (low-low), and hopefully none will be high at both levels (high-high).
Within this framework, strong form tailored choices of law are most
likely to be low-high, since they require a complex adjudication which requires substantial data if it is not to mistake the parties' preferences. Untailored choices of law, such as a lex loci contractus rule, would seem to be
low-low, though they may become high-low if a generic rule is abandoned
in favor of setting different rules for different types of transactions. However, higher rule-setting costs may be offset if transaction-type rules are
better than generic rules at approximating party preferences. Conversely,
ex post adjudication costs may be higher if a generic untailored rule is reduced to a presumption, rebuttal of which is permitted under certain conditions.
In addition, there are two other low-low methods, besides generic untailored rules. One low-low method is to apply only the lexfori. The other
method is to defer to the parties' choice of law agreement where one exists.
In simple contract cases, a high-high strategy might involve a tailored approach, but the legislature may give detailed specifications for how courts
are to go about exercising their apparent discretion. Presumably, high-high
will be fairly rare. These strategies are depicted in tabular form in Table 1.

Table 1: Costs of Second Order Choice of Law Strategies
Low ex ante decision costs High ex ante decision costs
High-low:
Low-low:
Low ex post
parties' choice of -transaction-type
-apply
decision
untailored rule.
law;
costs
- lexfori;
-generic untailored rule.
High-high:
High ex post Low-high:
-tailored approaches with
-tailored approaches;
decision
detailed specification of
-generic untailored
costs
method.
presumption.

60
61

Sunstein & Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 16, at 5-13
1d. at 18-21.
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The advantage of setting out the possibilities this way is that it permits
a broad view of choice of law methods within a tightly organized framework. It also permits comparisons to be drawn between the costs of rulesetting and adjudication and between these forms of costs and the likelihood
that the ultimate choice of law will maximize whatever objective function
(efficiency, government interests) one specifies. Our analysis returns to this
framework on a number of occasions.
2. Tort Choice ofLaw Method
We now turn to consider choice of law rules in torts cases. We stated
in section II.B.3 that the effects of choice of law on accident precautions
should be negligible in non-market tort-cases. On the other hand, the
choice of law rule applicable to torts should do two things. First, it should
minimize the variance of judgments between forums, in order to minimize
forum shopping and therefore the costs of litigation.62 Second, the rule
should allow parties to ascertain what liability rules will apply to their conduct. This will in turn allow them to make decisions regarding their level of
injury-causing activity and the extent to which they should purchase insurance.
The choice of law method most obviously inimical to variance minimization is the lexfori. A number of choice of law rules can minimize variance. A lex loci delicti rule should do so, provided the locus delicti is
determined in similar ways across forums." However, rules which base a
selection on one or more pre-accident criteria (e.g., the defendant's domicile) will also do so. Nonetheless, party domicile is deficient according to
the second criterion, that of permitting the parties to know the standards applicable to them under tort liability rules. Although a different rule is arguably appropriate where there is a substantial relationship between
defendants,65 the lack of any pre-accident relationship between the parties
would make it impossible for a party to ascertain the applicable tort rules
where these were selected on the basis of the other party's attributes. Thus,
in these cases, a rule that allows both parties to know in advance which law
62

In saying this, we are ascribing to a multilateralist theory of conflicts, in which conflicts rules are administered in substantially similar ways across jurisdictions, in order to obtain substantial uniformity. But cf. Scott Fruehwald, A MultilateralistMethod of Choice of
Law, 85 KY. L.J. 347 (1996); JUENGER, supra note 8, at 13-14; Gene t. Shreve, Choice of
Law andthe ForgivingConstitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271,282-84 (1996).
63
Michael H. Gottesman, Drainingthe Dismal Swamp: The Casefor Federal Choice of

Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1991).
64See Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934). But cf. Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) Ltd. v.
Thompson, 1971 App. Cas. 458 (H.L.).
65
in stating this, we note the famous succession of "guest statute" cases. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). For economic analysis, see Whincop & Keyes, Torts, supra note 35, at 369-72.
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will be selected is preferable. Furthermore, both choice of law criteria favor
the use of the lex loci delicti for non-market torts. 6
Believers in the positive hypothesis of economic analysis of law (i.e.,
believers in the idea that the common law tends toward efficiency 67) may
not be surprised that U.S. and English law both initially adopted the lex loci
delicti as the basis of tort choice of law. However, in 1870 the choice of
law rule in England fused the lex loci delicti to the lexfori. In a judgment
that has caused over a century of scholarly head-scratching, Willes J., in the
case of Phillips v. Eyre, stated that the wrong alleged must be "actionable"
had it been6 committed
in the forum and must not be 'justifiable" by the lex
8
loci delicti.
We have argued elsewhere that the rule in Phillips v. Eyre could be an
efficient rule under two conditions.6 9 First, forum law would have to be
used only to cut down the extent of the claim permitted by the lex loci delicti.70 The basis for this argument is that courts are more likely to make
mistakes in applying foreign law the greater the differences between forum
law and the lex loci delicti because of their greater lack of familiarity. The
rule in Phillips v. Eyre would therefore require substantial similarity between the two bodies of law if recovery were to be permitted, which would
decrease the number and cost of judicial errors.7 1
Because such a rule creates a disincentive to litigate outside the locus
delicti,72 the second efficiency condition is that the locus delicti would have
to be the forum in which the parties' costs to settle the litigation are minimized. If that is not so, the rule may be inefficient even if it minimizes the
cost of errors in the application of law.
Alas, experience showed that the rule in Phillips v. Eyre was not to be
a tougher version of the lex loci delicti but simply a more confusing version
of the lex fori. This came about in three ways. First, some cases gave
flimsy definitions of justifiability in the lex loci delicti, making that an illu-

66We do not analyze intentional torts here, but perhaps the lexfori has appeal as a deterrent in intentional tort cases. See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d
67967(N.Y. 1985).
See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977).
686 L.R.-Q.B. 1, 28-29 (1870).
69
Whincop & Keyes, Torts,supra note 35.
70 Stevens v. Head, (1993) 176 C.L.R. 433, 441 (Mason, J., dissenting) (recommending
the lex loci delicti approach).
71Stanley E. Cox, The Interested Forum, 48 MERCER L. REV. 727, 733 (1997). This
should, in turn, increase the predictability of litigation, and therefore the likelihood of settlement. On the settlement of litigation, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Legal
ProcedureandJudicialAdministration,2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
72
Because differences count against the plaintiff.
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sory obstacle for the forum shopper. 73 Second, other cases claimed that
Phillips v. Eyre was only a threshold requirement that established justiciability in a forum and that therefore the lexfori was the real choice of law
rule.74 Third, English and Australian courts regularly used escape devices,
most notably the substance-procedure distinction 7s and a so-called flexible
Th7rl
rule has been, in short, a disaster.77 It remains the law in
exception. 76 The
78
Australia. English legislation appears to have abrogated it in favor of the
lex loci delicti, but the escape devices remain.79
United States courts never had to grapple with Phillipsv. Eyre, but dissatisfaction with the lex loci delicti mounted.8 ° The problem lay in the fact
that Beale (and Justice Story before him) claimed that the powers of a sovereign were strictly defined in a territorial way such that a court never applied foreign law. Instead a court applied local law to recognize a right that
had vested elsewhere. The latter point was easy to debunk as formalistic
piffle. However, that still left the first half: that courts should apply their
own law, not foreign law. In other words, the rejection of vested rights
caused scholars, foremost among them Brainerd Currie, to shift their horizons back to the forum and the application of its laws. Hence, Professor
Currie argued that the only reason a forum should apply foreign law is if, in
substance, it did not have any interest in the case. The application of foreign law thwarts forum policies.8

73

See, e.g., Machado v. Fontes, (1897) 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.) ("Justifiable" means neither
nor "legally innocent" but something in between).
"tortious"
74
See, e.g., Anderson v. Eric Anderson (Radio & T.V.) Pty. Ltd., (1965) 114 C.L.R. 20.
75
See McKain v. R.W. Miller & Co. (So. Austl.) Pty. Ltd., (1991) 174 C.L.R. I (holding
"limitation of actions" statute procedural); Stevens v. Head, (1993) 176 C.L.R. 433 (holding
"recoverable heads of damage" statute procedural).
76
Boys v. Chaplin, 1971 App. Cas. 356; Red Sea Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Bouygues S.A., [1995]
Cas. 109.
1 App.
77
The rule was heavily criticized in LAW COMMISSION, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CHOICE OF LAW IN TORT AND DELICT, Working Paper No. 87 (1984).
78
See McKain, 174 C.L.R. at 1; Stevens, 176 C.L.R. at 433.
79
See Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 ch. 42, §§ 11, 12
(U.K.).
80
A number of states adhere to it nonetheless. For recent cases, see Holman v. McMullan Trucking, 1996 WL 652639 (Ala. 1996) and Blais v. Allied Exterminating Co., 482
S.E.2d. 659, 1996 WL 716714 (W. Va. 1996). See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in
the American Courts in 1996: Tenth Annual Survey, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 447, 458-60 (1997)
(noting that, as of the end of 1996, twelve jurisdictions adhere to lex loci delicti).
81CURRIE, supra note 6, at 183, 278. Not every advocate of interest analysis thinks that it
needs to favor the forum. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in
the Conflict of Laws and the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 493 (1985).
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We do not intend to recount the many variations on interest analysis.82
The basic premise of interest analysis has fatal flaws.83 Even a case such as
Babcock' v. Jackson, thought to exemplify interest analysis, makes little
sense. It is difficult to comprehend the justification for saying that state A
has no interest in litigation between two residents of state B when the litigation arises out of an accident occurring in state A.84 If a person drives
negligently, he may expect to injure a passenger, but it is just as likely that
he will injure an in-state resident. If one believes, as economists do, that
tort law is about deterrence, 6 state A has a strong interest in applying its
law to persons driving within its territory.87 A significant portion of the expected costs of negligence will fall on in-state residents.
There are other significant economic criticisms of interest analysis.
Judge Posner argues that interest analysis may impair the economic capacity of whichever state has the advantage in formulating regulations that are
sensitive to conditions within its borders (which state is logically the locus
delicti).88 Professors Kobayashi and Ribstein argue that interest analysis
extends the effect of deals cut by rent-seeking interest groups, which, as
noted above, 89 are likely to be inefficient. 90

Most of these comments apply also to the approach to torts conflicts
described in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. 9 The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) is somewhat incoherent here. It claims to be
guided by a range of principles such as "the relevant policies of the forum"
and "certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result" which even it admits
cannot all be accommodated.92 Its approach to tort cases is not dissimilar to
8

2See

Friedrich K. Juenger, General Course on Private InternationalLaw, 193

RECUEIL

DES83COURS

119, 219 (1983).
See Lea Brilmayer, GovernmentalInterest Analysis: A House Without Foundations,46
OHIO
ST. L.J. 459, 461 (1985).
84
See Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice ofLaw: How it Ought Not To Be, 48 MERCER L. REv.

757, 758 (1997) ("There is an almost inexhaustible array of moves and countermoves
available to keep [interest analysts] entertained. Thus, any run-of-the-mill traffic accident
can serve as the basis for a long and erudite analysis of the policies and interests at stake." ).
'5 See generally Larry Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-For"Case, 75 VA. L. REV.

104586 (1989).

See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort87Law Really Deter?, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV.377 (1994).
See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and CorrectiveJustice, 75 Tax. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (suggesting significant similari-

ties between deterrence and corrective justice); see also Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d
106, 111-12 (N.J. 1996) (affirming deterrence as a factor in products liability case).
88 See POSNER, supra note 13, at 646. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTs:
CRISIS AND REFORM 305-06 (1985).
89
See supra text accompanying note 49.

90

Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 43.

91
RESTATEMENT
92

Id. at § 6.

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws

§ 145 (1971).
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its contract approach, because it focuses on the state with "the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties" ' 3 in terms of a range of

relevant contacts of variable importance.94 This approach has been adopted
at least to some extent by a substantial number of states. 95
One of the difficulties with such a broad-based approach to selecting
the law is that it increases the costs of information for parties wanting to ascertain the lex causaein order to determine the applicable liability rules and
the appropriate response to them. The more relevant factors involved, the
more information required. The uncertain importance of any one of the
factors mentioned in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) increases the likelihood
that outcomes will be indeterminate. This will complicate rational choices
96
by the parties and will affect the precautions parties take against loss.
Like interest analysis, which it partially embraces, the application of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) often turns out to have significant biases towards the lexfori.9 As explained earlier, this increases forum shopping,
which is inefficient because it requires parties to outlay higher costs than
they would if judgments were substantially invariant across forums. Additionally, the lexfori makes it impossible, not just difficult, to know the applicable liability rules.
Thus, despite much criticism, the lex loci delicti rule seems superior
the alternative choice of law rules that we have discussed. However, so far
we have only spoken in very general terms about torts. The next section
analyzes the case of the market tort in detail. As we shall see, the superiority of the lex loci delicti substantially deteriorates on analysis, while the interest-based methods remain just as unattractive as before.
3. A Method ForMarket Torts
We said in part II.B.2 that a choice of law method applying to market
torts should do two things. In the absence of market failure problems, it
should uphold the parties' bargain in relation to matters of care and cost
bearing, where such a bargain exists. Second, it should select liability rules
that facilitate contracting and the formation of markets. We examine possible methods, assessing each one's ability to perform these tasks, and we examine some of the choice of law problems that have emerged in previous
93

Id. at § 145(1).
1d. at § 145(2).
95
See Symeonides, supra note 80, at 458.
96
See generally Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986). But cf. Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1989). This comment
applies equally to interest analysis.
97
See Symeonides, supra note 80, at 457. Of course, some states simply adopt the lex
fori. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a ProperForum: A "Restatement" of the "LexFori"Approach,18 OKLA. L. REv. 340 (1965).
94
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market tort litigation. This leads us to propose the elements of a contractarian approach to market torts.9 8
(a) Interest Analyses and the Lax Fori
There is no reason to believe that interest-based or lexfori approaches
become any more suitable when one limits one's analysis to market torts.
As we said in Part I, market torts often involve an increased number of jurisdictions relevant to the case, further multiplying the number of identifiable interests. 99 The lex fori approach continues to encourage forum
shopping. If plaintiffs can invoke the law of their preferred forum, the effective liability rules to which the defendant corporation is subject become
more onerous, which shifts supply curves to the north-west and increases
equilibrium prices. Because price discrimination is either practically or legally impossible, all consumers will pay the same higher price, even consumers in that proportion of the population (which will rise as the expected
costs of forum shopping rise) that would have preferred to pay less and shift
the risks they bear by obtaining first-party insurance.
Public choice theory has been used in two recent, very interesting
analyses of choice of law in products liability cases. 00 The arguments in
both cases are based on the premise that states want to favor local residents
at the expense of those from out-of-state. Michael McConnell argues that
this dynamic leads states to expand the scope of their substantive products
liability. Interest analysis, he states, intensifies this effect by increasing the
choice of liability regimes available to a plaintiff 101 Professor McConnell's
substantive argument, with which we agree, is that this problem would best
be solved by a choice of law rule favoring the law of the place where the
product is sold. 10 2 This would decrease the effect of cost externalization on
substantive reforms.
Bruce Hay's argument is that substantive and conflictual rules are not
mutually reinforcing, contrary to Professor McConnell's claim. Professor
98The use of contractarian
approaches to economic analysis of law is an ever-expanding
field. For representative examples of its applicability to other fields, see EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 13 (corporate law); John H. Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the
Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995) (trusts); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On
the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor'sBargain, 75
VA. L. REv. 155 (1989) (bankruptcy); Schwartz, supra note 34 (products liability).
99
See Shimon A. Rosenfeld, Note: Conflicts of Law in Product Liability Suits: Joint
Maximization ofStates' Interests, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 139, 147 (1986).
'G0See Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability
System, 80 GEo. L. J. 617 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to

Products-Liability Reform, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 90 (Walter Olson ed.,

1988).
101McConnell, supra note 100, at 93-94.
102 Id. at 98. See also Erin O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Interest Groups, Contracts and
InterestAnalysis, 48 MERCER L. Rnv. 765, 769-70 (1997).
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Hay argues that a state's best position is to prefer a pro-plaintiff conflictual
rule, thereby permitting not only a wider choice of liability regimes for use
against out-of-state defendants but also a products liability standard that is
less demanding of manufacturers. A state with such a standard would use
interest analysis to permit its consumers to benefit from the relatively stringent laws of other states, yet it would not increase its manufacturers' liability exposure to out-of-state plaintiffs.10 3 This is an ingenious counter
argument' 0 4 but it does not contradict the inherent tendency of interest
analysis to permit forum shopping and cost-externalization. Very likely,
from the public choice perspective we have adopted, Professor McConnell's argument is correct considering that the interest analysis method may
well be demanded by in-state lawyers in order to attract litigation from outof-state plaintiffs on the basis of the outside states' favorable laws.'0 5
(b) The Lex Locus Delicti: American and English Variants
Earlier in part II.C.2, we stated that lex loci delicti has much to recommend it because it minimizes variance across forums and permits mutual
ascertainment of applicable liability rules. However, this advantage does
not apply to all torts equally. It has strong appeal in non-market torts involving personal injuries. Nevertheless, the more efficient the market in
which the tort arises, the less suitable the lex loci delicti becomes. As
transaction costs fall, markets coordinate the flow of resources across an increasingly wide geographical area. It is common for analyses of choice of
law in products liability to refer to hypothetical cases where a manufacturer
incorporated in A manufactures products in B, and puts them into the
stream of commerce in C. A consumer domiciled in D buys them in E, and
is injured in F.'0 6 Almost all of these jurisdictions have some relevance to
the tort. The law comes to depend on a method for determining the locus
delicti. The vested rights school argues that the right could only vest on the
occurrence of the last event comprising the tort; hence, the place of the last
event was dispositive10 7 The problem is that, except for goods which are
consumed at much the same time as the sale, the "last place" can be very
difficult for the manufacturer (and the consumer) to predict at the time of
the sale.
In contrast, Anglo-Australian law rejected the last event rule. Instead,
it embraced a theory that the locus delicti will be within a particular juris103Hay, supra note 100, at 632-38.

1'4Which, ultimately, should be resolved empirically. For anecdotal evidence, see Gottesman, supra note 63, at 44.
'°5Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 311, 313 (1988).
1
°6See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 100, at 93; C.G.J. Morse, Products Liability in the
Conflict
ofLaws, CURR. LEGAL PROB. 167, 171-73 (1989).
107 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).

238

The Market Tort in Private InternationalLaw
19:215 (1999)

diction if the act of the defendant that gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint occurs there." 8
Perhaps this theory is superior in that it is less influenced by events that
occur after the transaction between the parties, but it has a complementary
flaw. In applying this rule, English and Australian products liability cases
have tended to differentiate two case types. One case type involves a general flaw in design or manufacture. The other involves a product that,
though not defective, creates particular hazards for a certain type of consumer, for example, thalidomide for a pregnant woman. In the first case
type, the locus delicti will typically be the place of design or manufacture.
In the second case type, the locus delicti is likely to be the place the consumer should have received a warning.
This is a dysfunctional rule. As a matter of policy, it is unclear why
the victim of a generally unsafe product should be subject to (typically) foreign law while the other type of victim will typically be able to rely on local
law. The distinction has real consequences because the plaintiff will not
know under which law his rights will fall. To know the rights would imply,
absurdly, a knowledge of the form of the negligence. Subjecting the plaintiff's rights with respect to defective manufacture to foreign law also imposes costs of information as to the content of that law. Given that the
matter can only be resolved in court, uncertainties will bedevil pricing in
product markets and insurance arrangements. These problems reflect the
inadequacy of doctrinal solutions to policy problems.
(c) A Contractual Solution to Market Tort Choice of Law?
If extant tort solutions are dysfunctional, can contract choice of law
methods offer anything better? Recall that contract approaches typically refer to the law agreed on by the parties. If there is no, or no valid, choice,
the proper law of the contract is usually referred for decision to the jurisdiction with the most significant relation to the contract and the parties, although other methods are possible.
The suitability of party choice of law to market torts depends on the
extent to which parties make rational, welfare-maximizing choices between
possible contract terms. If parties did make rational choices, its appeal as a
choice of law method would be considerable. It would make for substantial
uniformity of results, if all forums respect choices of law. It represents, as
noted above, a genuine "low-low" decision approach, since the formulation
of a rule respecting contractual choices should be simple, and the enforcement of the choice reduces greatly the amount of time spent on resolving
08

The leading case in Anglo-Australian law is Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) Ltd. v.

Thompson, (1971) App. Cas. 458 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.S.W.). See also Buttigeig v.
Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp. 1972 V.R. 626.(Vict. Sup. Ct.); Castree v. E.R.
Squibb Ltd., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1248 (C.A.); Jackson v. Spittall, (1870) 5 L.R.-P.C. 542.
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the choice of law question in the ultimate adjudication. Moreover, unlike
the other apparent "low-low" strategy - apply the lexfori - it should not
motivate costly forum shopping. It should unquestionably facilitate market
pricing because the contract locks in liability rules and permits them to be
priced more easily. It should also validate more express provisions of the
contract than the other methods we have seen.
The next part explores in detail the merits of express choices of law in
market torts. However, express choices are not a sufficient solution because the parties may not make a choice, or the actual choice may be invalid for various reasons. Thus, there remains an unresolved issue: What
form should "unchosen" choice of law rules take?
To put this in economic terms, tort rules represent allocations of property rights that supplement the express content of the parties' contract. Our
task is to explore the best means of choosing supplementary rules in default
of an express choice. Can we do no better than the deficient choices explored above? In Part III we argue that the application of the economic
theories of contract default rules and of discretion in adjudication do reveal
better solutions.
(d) The Reception of Contractual Solutions
Before moving to the constructive analysis in the subsequent parts of
the paper, we must ask a question: if contract choice of law methods are
potentially a superior means of resolving choice of law problems in market
torts, why have they not had more currency in the case law, or academic
commentary? The answer is simple enough in American law. Vested
rights theory and the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) were hostile to choice. 0 9 By
the time their influence waned, forum-preferring methods were the "invogue" choice of law methods.110 These encouraged plaintiffs to select forums that would not recognize contractual choices. Hence, there has never
been a scholarly constituency in U.S. conflicts scholarship that has advocated contractual choice of tort law."'
109See, e.g., Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll, II So. 803, 808-09 (Ala.
1892) ("[T]he duties and liabilities incident to the relation between the plaintiff [employee]
and the defendant [employer] ... are not imposed by, and do not rest in or spring from, the
contract between the parties. .. . The whole argument is at fault. The only true doctrine is
that each.., state... has the exclusive power to finally determine and declare what act or
omissions in the conduct of one to another.. . shall impose a liability in damages.").

11 But cf. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. RFv. 277, 329-34

(1990) (permitting choice of law in cases raising true conflicts).
.. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed in Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 102, at 772-74. This case involved a suit brought in relation to a
medical procedure in another state which limited damages for wrongful injury of death. Forum law favoring unlimited liability was applied. We agree with the criticisms of Professors
Ribstein and O'Hara, which argue in favor of the importance of ex ante expectations. Id. We
do not deal with medical torts in this article.
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English law is another matter, since it has a longer history of enforcing
contractual choices of law. Market torts did not assimilate contract choice
of law characteristics because of the destabilizing use of doctrinal characterization. 12 Because judges tend to tag market tort issues as tortious,
rather than contractual, they have been able to avoid giving full effect to the
parties' contract. This tendency is manifest in two types of cases. In the
first type, the court permits a party to a contract to assert rights in tort which
would be unsustainable under the proper law of the contract. The clearest
example is the English Court of Appeal case, Coupland v. Arabian Gulf
Petroleum Co." 3 That case involved an industrial accident in Libya, in
which the plaintiff, a Scot, was injured. The plaintiff sought damages in
tort in an English forum. The court was prepared to accept for the purposes
of a strike out action that the proper law of the contract was Libyan law. It
held, however, that the plaintiff was entitled to advance a claim in tort. As
the alleged tort would have been actionable in Libya, that part of the rule in
Phillipsv. Eyre was satisfied and the matter could be resolved according to
English law. The Court of Appeal held that the proper law of the contract
had no relevance to the tort claim. The plaintiff was entitled to frame his
suit as a claim in tort, if he thought it advantageous to do so. This type of

Our contractarian analysis applies here too. One must determine first whether parties
should be able to contract in relation to choice of law in these cases. Obviously some medical cases, such as those involving necessity, should not be subject to contract. However,
cases in which a person goes interstate seeking a renowned doctor suggests that the market
for medical procedures may be working well enough to permit rational choices.
Then, if no choice of law is made or a choice is not permitted, one must determine which
default rule should be used. We believe that the place of the medical procedure should be
used, as it best represents patient preferences. This is so for several reasons. First, states
should be able to compete for the business of health care providers, provided the costs are
not imposed on those who cannot participate in the political process or on those who have
not chosen to associate with the state.
Second, not to use a place of procedure rule runs the risk that, especially in the case of
emergency admissions, hospitals might have to refuse to treat a patient it they cannot ascertain her domicile. Third, favoring the law of high-recovery forums will increase the cost of
medical procedures, since the defendant becomes a third party insurer of a very heterogeneous risk class. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
There are good reasons why a patient might be prepared to accept a cap on damages for
wrongful death. He will obviously not enjoy any of the damages himself (notwithstanding
the inexplicable comments to the contrary in David Currie, Choice ofLaw: How It Ought To
Be, 48 MERCER L. REv. 639, 703 (1997) ("People ought to get full recompense for injuries of
this nature."). Except for the case where the patient has dependants, for whom provision
would certainly be most inexpensively made by first-party life insurance, no patient would
be prepared to pay for insurance of this sort. See generally Phillip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demandfor InsuranceandProtection: The Case ofirreplaceableCommodities, 91

Q.J. EcON. 143 (1977).
112For references, see supratext accompanying notes 25-28.
13 Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Petroleum Co., [1983] 3 All E. R. 226 (Eng. Ct. App.).
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plaintiff therefore has a substantial ability to answer the characterization
question by how she pleads her case.
Denying the relevance of the proper law of the contract to the adjudication of the tort is undesirable. As we have argued, parties to a contract
need to know the form of liability rules that apply to them. An employee
needs to know the risks that the law allocates to her in order to make a rational decision regarding the remuneration that compensates her for bearing
them. The employee may want to effect first party insurance coverage, and
the employer may want to insure against tort liability to the employee. This
is much harder to do if the applicable tort rules cannot be known ex ante,
and are only revealed at the time of trial.
Markets will also be affected adversely. Plaintiff-selected tort rules
make the risks to which the employer is exposed much harder to segregate
into risk pools. The employer's insurance against third party claims will
become more expensive. Y 4 In the extreme case of hazardous occupations,
insurance may become altogether unavailable, which may in turn decrease
employment. These consequences imply that the parties should be able to
know and, ideally, fix the tort law that applies to claims arising under the
contract.
Former Justice Peter Nygh makes a similar argument in a lecture given
in the Hague.11s Marshalling a formidable body of support from continental
law systems, Professor Nygh argues that choice of law problems should be
resolved by the parties' express choice of the law. Professor Nygh also argues that even in the absence of express choice, the courts should apply the
same law of the cause, whether the cause of action is contractual or tortious.
argues, would best give effect to the parties' reasonable expectaThis, he
6
tions.'
In Coupland, Lord Goff (then Goff L.J.) made a significant comment
when he said:
The plaintiff can advance his claim, as he wishes, either in contract or
in tort; and no doubt he will, acting on advice, advance the claim on the
basis which is most advantageous to him. . . . [T]he contract is only
relevant to the claim in tort in so far as it does, on its true construction
in accordance with the proper law of the1 7contract, have the effect of excluding or restricting the tortious claim.'
How have English courts treated exclusion clauses in choice of law
cases? Peter North has argued that these clauses can be analyzed in four

114 See Priest, supra note 23 at 1582-87.

1156 Nygh, supra note 54, at 356-59, 374.
11 See generally Peter M. North, Torts in the Dismal Swamp: Choice ofLaw Revisited, in
ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (Peter M. North ed., 1993).
1173 All Eng. Rep. at 228.
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different ways." 8 First, one could refer the validity of the exclusion to the
law selected by the tort choice of law rule. Second, one could vary this
method by inquiring as to the validity of the exclusion under the proper law
of the contract, once one has ascertained that the lex causae applicable to
the tort permits exclusions. So, in Brodin v. AIR Sejan,119 a court refused
to enforce a contract excluding an employee's rights to compensation apart
from what was available under Norwegian law. The employer was a Norwegian company and had employed the plaintiff, a resident of Scotland, to
work on one of its ships. The accident occurred when the ship was docked
in a Scottish port. The limitation of liability was invalid under Scottish law.
The case is an example of the first approach, but the second approach would
produce the same result.
The problems of Couplandresurface here. Referring the lex causae to
a tort choice of law rule based on an unpredictable lex loci delicti or lexfori
is inefficient. Consider that in a case like Brodin, injuries could occur in
many places around the world. It is surely inefficient that the parties' rights
should depend on where the accident actually occurs. By increasing the uncertainty associated with applicable liability rules and risk-bearing arrangements, this method adversely affects insurance and labor markets and
complicates the underlying contracting process.
Professor North describes two other methods which may, in part, overcome these problems. One uses the proper law of the contract to adjudicate
the validity of the exclusion. The other uses a unique choice of law rule,
which would consider both the circumstances of the contract and the tort.
Both approaches are used in the Court of Appeal decision in Sayers v.
InternationalDrilling Co. N. .120 That case, also an industrial accident,
this time involved injury to an English plaintiff employed by the Dutch defendant to work outside of the England. The injury was sustained on board
a Nigerian oil rig. The plaintiff's contract provided for a compensation
scheme should the plaintiff be injured, but it excluded his rights under English tort or workplace insurance law. The plaintiff sued in England seeking
damages for negligence. The limitation was held valid under Dutch law but
not valid in England. Stamp and Salmon L.JJ. held that the proper law of
the contract was Dutch and that the limitation should take effect. This is
consistent with Professor North's contractual approach. Lord Denning
M.R.'s approach in the case is consistent with imposing a unique choice of
law rule based on the proper law of the contract (which he thought was
English) and of the tort (which he thought was Dutch). However, he
thought that the contract helped him to break the deadlock, since it could
only have been valid under Dutch law.
18

Peter M. North, Contract as a Tort Defence in the Conflict of Laws, in ESSAYS
LAW 89 (Peter M. North ed., 1993).
9
g0Brodin v. A/R Seljan, 1973 Sess. Cas. 213 (Scot.).
12Sayers v. Int'l Drilling Co., N.V., [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1176 (Eng. Ct. App.).
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An approach designed to isolate a unique choice of law which upholds
the express provisions of the contract is a desirable feature of a market tort
choice of law rule. 2 1 Thus, English (and Scottish) law takes an erratic approach to contractual solutions in choice of law cases. Much of the blame
lies in the formalistic way in which courts have approached characterization
issues.
D. Conclusion
Part H has covered a great deal of ground, which is worth briefly recapping. First, legal rules affect the distribution of property rights and obligations between contracting parties. These legal rules are significant in a
world of positive transaction costs and economic analysis can reveal the efficiency effects of different allocations. Choice of law issues are relevant to
cases that involve contracting, including cases involving market torts, because they influence the range of bargains that parties can strike and they
regulate the selection of the corpus of law from which contractsupplementing legal rules are drawn. We have pointed out that choice of
law rules have efficiency effects in non-contractual tort cases but that efficiency supports different tort choice of law rules in each case. We described the principal contract and tort rules in Anglo-American law, and we
introduced a framework, to which we will return subsequently, which permits simple comparison of choice of law methods. We also showed that
though both systems have generally suitable contract methods, tort rules
have often been characterized by inefficient forum preferences, indeterminate analysis, and muddled policy aspirations.
At the end of this part, we confront two principal issues. First, should
parties be able to choose the tort law that applies to injuries arising out of a
contract? Second, what is the optimal choice of law method for market
torts and what will the content be of the chosen method's rules? We must
also ask whether there is an interaction between the responses to the two
questions. For example, we may want one rule to apply where a choice was
permitted but not made and another rule to apply where a choice is not permitted. In the following parts, we will emphasize that the efficiency of
markets and the nature of transactions affect one's confidence in contractual
solutions, and the suitability of the underlying choice of law rule. We will
not analyze every possible market tort, but we will address two of the most
important: products liability and securities litigation brought by investors.
An examination of these market torts shows how choice of law depends on
market context.

121See supra text accompanying note 54.
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I.

A CONTRACTARIAN CHOICE OF LAW METHOD FOR MARKET TORTS

A. Contractual Choices of Tort Law
In this part, we examine the cases for and against the grant of autonomy to parties to make a choice of law in their contract that applies to all
legal issues arising from it. Its effect would, in this analysis, not be subject
to diminution or escape by the sophistry of characterization. The parties
would typically make their agreement in a choice of law clause. A little
later we consider
the formality with which parties should be able to make a
12 2
choice of law.

1. Advantages
The preceding part foreshadowed many of the advantages of contractual choices. Before examining criticisms, it is worth recounting these advantages.
First, contractual choices increase the number of contracts the parties
can write. A wider scope for choice of contracts makes it more likely that
parties will be able to avoid the effect of local tort rules that make inefficient allocations of property rights and obligations.' 23 This is a particular
problem because tort rules often take mandatory, uncontractible forms.
Where party preferences for contract terms are heterogeneous, as they
mostly will be, contractual choices of law will dominate alternative choice
of law methods, unless the court is a competent exponent of strong form
tailoring. For example, when people would prefer to insure to different levels, the case for contract is very strong. As mentioned above, insurance
markets unravel where insurers (producers under tort rules) cannot segregate risks into classes. Locking parties into the generally inflexible tort
rules of either a single tort regime or a regime selected by a plaintiff ex post
creates the difficulties
for product and insurance markets that we have de124
scribed above.
There may be reasons to believe that even if tort rules were doctrinally
in the nature of defaults, few parties would contract out of them. Recent
law and economics research has suggested two reasons why parties may not
contract out of defaults, even though the allocation produced by an alternative term appears to be Pareto superior1 25 to the default arrangement. One
reason is that contract terms associated with tort rules may be affected by
learning and network externalities. 126 Parties may prefer to adopt terms that
'2 2 See infra text accompanying notes 152-156.
2

See generally Priest, supra note 14.

124 See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.

'25That is, both parties would be better off.

126See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in

Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713 (1997);
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have been commonly used in the past because of the institutional "learning"
available in respect of their terms. Such terms are, for example, easier to
draft, more certain in their operation, simpler to explain to others, and so
on. Similarly, parties may prefer to adopt terms that are contemporaneously
used, or expected to be used in the future, in other contracts. The pioneering legal scholarship in this area demonstrates that the presence of such effects may lead to sub-optimal contracting, because there is either too much
standardization or too little. It is very likely that substantive market tort
rules are affected by these externalities. The long history of uncontractibility of tort rules and of judicial skepticism about exclusion clauses in contracts, as well as the difficulty of specifying terms in relation to care, all
combine to create lock-in effects. By contrast, contractual choice of tort
parties to bargain for different rules by selecting a
law permits contracting
27
law.
different
A second, competing reason is that parties have a psychological predisposition against changes to the status quo. 28 Russell Korobkin has argued for, and found experimental evidence in favor of, a hypothesis that
parties will substantially undervalue changes to the status quo position, embodied in the (domestic) default. Again, there may be some value in the
virtual menu effect of choices of law in overcoming a status quo bias.
Second, contractual choices of law, if enforced, stifle the incentive of
the plaintiff to select a forum on the basis of the substantive favorability of
tort rules. Since tort choice of law rules continue to have either forum biases or devices to escape to forum law, this is a real concern. 129 A wide
recognition of the right to select law contractually would be a major control
on forum shopping, because it decreases the variance of awards between forums. In principle, the plaintiff should select a forum based on its ability to
minimize her costs of litigation. This will not necessarily minimize the

Michael Klausner, Corporations,Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REv. 757 (1995). For references to the literature on learning and network, see, e.g., Joseph
Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON.
70 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An
Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994).
127 See Whincop & Keyes, ProperLaw of the Contract,supra note 33, at 527. As we ar-

gued there, the choice of law mechanism resembles a virtual menu of terms from which parties may choose. See also Klausner, supra note 126, at 837-42. Professor Klausner has
suggested that menu options may be better than single default rules in combating the effect
of network externalities. See generally HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE
CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 115-16 (1995). See also Siegelman v. Cunard White
Star, 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir., 1955).
128Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and ContractDefault Rules, 83 CORNELL L.

REv.29608 (1998).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 68-95.
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parties' joint costs, but it is a good start, which may be complemented by
appropriate jurisdiction rules on transfer of proceedings.130
Third, contractual choices of law provide a crucial circuit-breaker for
the current of indeterminacy that runs through multi-state market torts as a
result of the prevalent use of the lex loci delicti, the lex fori, or interest
analyses.13 ' Contractual choices provide certainty at the time of contracting, which increases the future enforceability of any express terms of their
contracts, thereby facilitating both product and insurance markets. This
state of affairs may also be consistent with giving effect to the parties' reasonable expectations. 32 Reasonable expectations resonate more with justice considerations than with efficiency considerations, but they share with
economic analysis a focus on party interests.
Fourth, contractual choice of law provides a low-cost means by which
contracting parties can "exit" a state imposing inefficient, interest groupserving rules. 133 Many current tort choice of law methods provide a means
to
by which interest group legislation can extend the coverage of their laws 134
persons and firms who have no voice in that state's political process.
This increases the abilities of states to externalize costs. Consistently with
Hirschman's famous analysis, the only option remaining to these firms is to
exit. 135 Contractual choices are the surest means of exit. Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi go further and argue that the ability to exit by contractual choice of law plays a vital role in the evolution of state contracts
statutes towards efficiency. 136 Even scholars criticizing consequentialism
37
have emphasized the importance of being able to exit state regulation.
Fifth, as we have noted above, enforcing an agreed choice of law is a
low-low decision strategy in terms of the Sunstein-Ullman-Margalit
framework. 138 In other words, no great complexity is required to commit to
a legal rule (a second order strategy) that enforces contractual choices of
law. At the stage of adjudication, that rule minimizes the costs of decision,
since the court only needs to decide whether an enforceable choice of law
130 Whincop & Keyes, Torts, supra note 35, at 383-85.
131See supra text accompanying notes 92-96, 106-108.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 115-116.
133Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 43. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90, 96-

104.34

1 Hay, supra note 100; McConnell, supra note 100.
135See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
36

1 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 43. Accord, Whincop & Keyes, Statutes, supra note
41. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust andthe Economics ofFederalism, 26 J. L.
& EcoN. 23 (1983); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does FederalismMatter? Political Choice in a
FederalRepublic, 89 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1981); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal
Expenditures,
64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
137 Brilmayer, Rights, supra note 6, at 1306-08; Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and

74 MINN. L. Rnv. 1 (1989).
Territory,
8

13 See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
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exists. The only other low-low strategies are the plainly inefficient lexfori,
and the use of generic untailored rules (e.g. the lex loci contractus). If costs
are low under both party choices and generic untailored rules, the former
remains preferable because it is more likely to select a rule that maximizes
the parties' wealth.
There are, as we can see, strong reasons why courts should enforce
parties' choices of law. The next sub-section explores the limitations of
contractual choices of law.
2. Disadvantages
The reasons why a choice of law should not be enforced include
grounds which are economic in nature, but also include other issues that are
more political in nature. We examine the latter first.
(a) Political Reasons
Where substantive legal rules are found in "reform" statutes, or where
common law rules have powerful mandatory overtones, the enforcement of
a choice of foreign law seems to violate the policy of the law. We encountered these arguments above, when we discussed the effect of a contractual
choice of foreign law on a mandatory rule. 139 These sorts of arguments are
reinforced by the tendency to enforce legislative rules that apparently protect consumers in a wide, purposive manner.140 On this view, contractual
choices of law not only deprive consumers of protection but are subversive
of the function of law-makers.
In another article, we have dismissed this argument, and argued for
what is an essentially literal enforcement of the statute's provisions regarding contractibility and choice of law and forum.141 We accept that the value
of purposive interpretations in substantive situations may often be high, because it will be rare for the text to apply clearly to all possible situations. In
these cases, purposive interpretation functions in a gap-filling function,
given the limits on legislative foresight.1 42 However, the value of purposive
interpretations in respect of the relation between the statute and private ordering is, on the same argument, much lower. Unlike a potentially vast
number of statutory situations, there are only four ways by which parties
can avoid the scope of, or "exit" legislation. First, they can change the pa139See supra text accompanying notes 39-50.
140 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REv. 405,426-34 (1989).
141Whincop & Keyes, Statutes, supra note 41.
142 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation- in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 800, 817-20 (1983). But cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CI. L. REv. 533, 540 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. Rnv. 223 (1986).
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rameters of their contract and their relation to particular states in order to
avoid the application of the legislation by the choice of law rules applied by
the courts of the state enacting it. Second, the parties can attempt to contract around the rule itself. Third, the parties can avoid the provision by a
choice of law clause. Fourth, the parties can agree to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, and so submit to the4 rrocess of a forum which will apply another, presumably preferred law.1
Although not true of every Act, much legislation makes specific provision for the effect of these purported exits, most obviously in respect of
substantive opting out, but also in respect of choices of law and forum.' 44
For example, in relation to exit by re-ordered contracting, the contract may
specify an express criterion of operation. 45 In relation to choice of forum,
the statute may provide that the jurisdiction of courts may not be ousted by
a provision submitting to the jurisdiction of a foreign court. 46 Moreover,
although their phrasing may vary, these provisions are both similar and
simple in conception. Our argument is this: since there are generally good
reasons why party autonomy might be preserved, it is appropriate to regard
as destroyed only those parts of autonomy that the statute indicates, either

specifically or by necessary implication.1 47
There is also no particular reason why the elimination of, say, the right
to contract out of specific rules should be regarded as fatal to the right to the
private ordering of forum or choice of law. Domestic mandatory rules may
coexist with choice of law autonomy. For example, there may be less
chance of systematic unfairness to contracting parties if they must take foreign law in wholesale form (including procedural and mandatory rules),
143 Like

contractual choices of law, there is some difference in the extent to which English and American law enforce choices of jurisdiction. English and Australian law has generally taken a permissive approach, although mandatory rules may provide a reason not to
enforce. See The Eleftheria, 1970 P. 94 (Prob. Div.); Huddart Parker Ltd. v. The Ship Mill
Hill, (1960) 81 C.L.R. 502. American law initially refused to enforce forum selection
agreements. See, e.g., Benson v. Eastern Building & Loan Ass'n, 174 N.Y. 83, 86 (1903);
Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 359
U.S. 180 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971). For the last
half a century that rule has been undergoing substantial change. See also GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COuRTs 374-81 (1996); The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585
(1991). The change has not been without substantial criticism. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington
& Paul H. Haagen, Contractand Jurisdiction,1996 Sup. CT. REv. 331. In this article, we do
not want to give the impression that our arguments apply equally to choice of forum. While
there is much value in contractual forum selection, there may be potential problems of contingent incompleteness if the most efficient forum depends on the nature of the case.

144See,
e.g., CarriageofGoods by Sea Act 1991 (C'th Aust.), §§11, 16.
14

5 See generally Stuart Dutson, The TerritorialApplication of Statutes, 22 MON. U. L.
REv.4669 (1996).
1 See, e.g., Mont. Code. Ann. §28-2-708 (1997).
147Whincop & Keyes, Statutes, supra note 41, at 443-45.
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rather than giving parties an unlimited right to customise their agreements.
Likewise, the parties' willingness to submit to the courts of the same foreign jurisdiction as the law they have chosen is a credible signal that parties
are not simply attempting an opportunistic subversion of a local statute. On
law does
balance, the political argument against contractual choices of 1tort
48
not support limitations that are not clearly stated in the statute.
(b) Economic Reasons
Are there economic reasons not to enforce contractual choices of tort
law? The advocacy of contractual freedom by economists and libertarians
assumes that the contract does not have any external effects on third parties
to the contract.149 There may be a few cases where this assumption does not
hold. For example, a contract concerning the safety of products may have
external effects on bystanders. However, that sort of externality does not
require that the parties be deprived of their ability to contract, as the50injured
person can be, and usually is, given rights under a tort liability rule.
If we dismiss the significance of third party effects, the only economic
reason for denying parties the right to make contractual choices of tort law
is that they will systematically agree to inefficient, wealth-decreasing contractual terms. One must subscribe to some sort of market failure hypothesis. Such hypotheses come in two forms. One is a generic argument in
which parties will agree to sub-optimal choices of law, just as they will to
other contract terms. The other is a more specific argument which focuses
on unique contracting problems associated with choice of law.
At this stage, we neither acknowledge or dismiss the generic argument.
It is simply too generalised to be helpful, just as the tag "contract of adhesion" is more pejorative than it is descriptive. 5 1 There may be a paternalistic justification in certain cases for depriving parties of the right to make
choices of law, because of information costs, cognitive limitations on ra148 This approach to the statute involves the use of presumptive canons as tools of interpretation. This is consistent with recent theory: see Kramer, supra note 110; Sunstein, supra
note 140.
149Technically, it is assumed that there is no technological externality, where there is a
divergence between prices and marginal cost. The existence of a pecuniary externality, such
as a change in prices, is not a basis for legal intervention: see David D. Haddock et al.,
Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REv. 701, 723-26
(1987).
150 See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21 (contrasting liability rules and inalienable rights as means of protecting entitlements).
151See, e.g., Victor Brudney, CorporateGovernance,Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1424 (1985) (criticizing economic analyses of the corporation as a contract). But see, Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out ofFiduciary
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 13 (1990). In private
international law, a similar literature exists. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 14; Carrington & Haagen, supra note 143; Priest, supra note 14.
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tional choice, or moral hazard problems. But whether such justification
exists cannot be assessed from the armchair. It depends at the very least on
the dynamics of particular types of contracts, the abilities of particular types
of contracting parties, and the efficiency of relevant markets. Hence, we
examine this argument in Part IV in specific contexts.
Is there something special about contractual choices of law that makes
them more likely to be subject to market failure than other terms? The most
important consideration is the information costs associated with choices of
law. A party cannot make a rational decision regarding choices of law
without some knowledge of the substantive rules of the systems between
which he or she must choose. Assume Sj offers to sell goods to B on terms
of a contract selecting the law of jurisdiction J. B must decide whether to
buy the goods from Si or SK, who offers a contract selecting the law of K,
which happens to be B's domicile. Using K as a benchmark, B will bear a
risk under J law that has an expected monetary value of $50. B will act
contrary to her best interests if she buys from S3 without demanding at least
a $50 discount compared to the price at which she can buy from Si. B is incapable of doing this unless she knows (i) the risks she bears under the
competing laws; and (ii) the expected value of those risks (that is, their
probabilities and the value of harm). Likewise, if B does not know what
risks she bears, she will be incapable of deciding rationally whether or not
to buy insurance for the risk.
The acquisition of information regarding these risks is costly. 152 It is
probably beyond the capacity of many household contractors to acquire that
information with respect to most transactions.153 However, experienced
contractors and other "repeat players" may not be disadvantaged by having
to make these choices. The logical solution to this problem is to impose a
disclosure duty on the party offering a contract that would opt into foreign
law.15 4 Such a duty is justifiable because, in determining that the term was
optimal for its needs, the profferor will presumably have sunk the costs required to understand its effect. Also, the profferor is typically the one with
the lower information costs, as between the two parties.
It therefore makes sense to impose a duty on the profferor to disclose,
at the time of contracting (i) the fact of the choice of law clause and (ii) information that will help the other party to appreciate the salient differences
between the selected law and the law that will otherwise apply to the con15 2 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. Rnv. 623, 667-70 (1986); Howard Beales et al.,

Efficient Regulation ofConsumer Information, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 491, 501-12 (1981).
The 53
1 1f there were to be a substantial amount of contracting in favor of foreign law, mecha-

nisms would presumably develop to remedy any market failure. For example, consumer organizations might begin publishing reports on the effects of choosing foreign law.
54 Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CoRP. L. 245, 257-58 (1993). See
generally Beales et al., supra note 152.
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tract. If that duty is not discharged, the choice of law clause would be ineffective if its effect would be prejudicial to the other party. The parties
would fall back to the choice of law selected by the choice of law "default."
An exception to the duty might be made where the person being offered a contract containing a foreign choice of law clause is domiciled in
the country or state whose law is chosen, or where the person otherwise
could be assumed to be familiar with that country's law.
There might also be some subtle issues with regard to the way in which
the duty should be discharged.' 55 It might not be sufficient if the profferor
simply hands over a document that the law expects or obliges the other
party simply to read. A more active duty to warn may be appropriate, at
least where the document is not expected to be negotiated, as economic
analysis shows that consumers may rationally choose not to read such a
document. 56 It may be that legislatures should take active responsibility
for regulating the form and content of these disclosures. Comprehension
may be15facilitated,
and therefore information costs decreased, by standardi7
zation.

In addition to discharging this duty to disclose, the profferor would
have to comply with the procedural requirements of the general body of
contract law applicable to the contract, such as obligations of form and capacity. But which body of law would that be? It cannot be the selected
law, because that would beg the question of its validity. Typically, form
should be governed by the law applying in default of choice, sometimes
called the "putative" proper law.15 Obviously, this law needs to be selected
in a way that supports the object of decreasing the information costs of
those contracting in these situations.

155See Avery W. Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory
andthe Law of ContractFormation,89 MICH. L. Rnv. 215, 272-93 (1990) [hereinafter Katz,
Strategic Structure]. See generally Avery W. Katz, Your Terms or Mine: The Duty to Read
the FinePrintin Contracts,21 RAND J. ECON. 518 (1990) [hereinafter Katz, Your Terms].
156Katz, Your Terms, supra note 155.
157Klausner, supranote 126, at 829-41.

'In English law, this is the law with the closest connection to the contract. See generally White Cliffs Opal Mines Ltd. v. Miller, (1904) 4 S.R. (N.S.W.) 150; The Parouth,
[1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 351; SYKES & PRYLES, supra note 51, at 611-13. See also PETER E.
NYGH, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 304 (6th ed. 1995). There is, however, some
authority for the use of the lexfori. See Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co. Inc. v. Fay
(1987) 165 C.L.R. 197, 222, 261; Mackender v. Feldia A.G., 1967 Q.B. 590, 602-03. U.S.
law also uses the putative proper law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
cmt. d (1971). See generally Green v. Australian Industrial Investment Ltd. (1989) 90 A.L.R.
500; Australian Law Reform Commission, REPORT No. 58: CHOICE OF LAW §§ 8.12, 8.59

(1992); Andrew Bell, Jurisdictionand ArbitrationAgreements in Transnational Contracts,

PartII, .10 J. CONT. L. 97, 98-101 (1996). Forum law is problematic because of the risk of
forum shopping.
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of a choice of law, or how it should be determined in those cases where
choices should not be permitted because of market failure. The law so selected is important to choices of law agreed to by the parties for the two
reasons we have just seen: it provides the benchmark for disclosure of substantive law differences, and it should provide clarity in selecting the putative law in order to determine the applicable procedural requirements for
contracting.
B. Default and Mandatory Choices of Tort Law
How should the lex causae be selected where parties have not chosen,
or are not permitted to choose, a proper law? In analyzing this question, we
can return to the Sunstein-Ullman-Margalit framework, which trades off
the costs of decision at the time of choosing a second-order choice of law
strategy, and the costs of decision at the time of the first-order adjudication. 59 We must also analyze the broader efficiency effects of the choice of
law method, which we do by reference to the economic literature on rules
and standards.1 60 Our analysis considers four different choice of law methods. These are:
(1) Generic untailored rules (low-low);
(2) Transaction-type untailored rules (high-low);
(3) "Most significant relationship" analysis (low-high);
(4) Strong form tailoring (low-high).
We can also expand this range by substituting, in the first and second
methods, the use of a presumption for the inflexible rule.16 1 The presumption takes the same form as the rule but the court would be able to select
159

It is conventional in the literature to argue that rules are preferable to standards where
the subject matter recurs frequently, and in forms that are not materially different. See e.g.,
Kaplow, supra note 15. The rule economizes on the sum of the costs of rule-making and adjudication. Note, however, that there may be cases, particularly choice of law cases, where
this is not so. A low-low method could choose a high-adjudication-cost standard, whereas a
high-low or low-high method could choose a low-adjudication-cost rule. While this is a fair
point, we assume for the purposes of analysis that there is no correlation between a choice of
law method and the type of substantive rule it is likely to choose.
160
See supra note 15.
16 1The use of presumptions in choice of law is increasing. The Rome Convention applies
a rebuttable presumption that the place of residence or business of the party effecting the
contract's "characteristic" performance is the proper law of the contract: The Rome Convention, Art. 4(2). In the case of a sale of goods, the characteristic performance of the contract is
that of the seller; therefore the law of the seller's place of business is the proper law of the
contract.
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another law under certain circumstances. Obviously, a presumption involves somewhat higher costs at the time of the first-order adjudication than
the rule because the court may have to consider whether there is a case for
its rebuttal. In the analysis that follows, we shall refer to the first and second methods collectively as "pre-emptive" when they do not admit rebuttal,
and "presumptive" in other cases.
1. Choice ofLaw Defaults
The case for pre-emptive rules is a strong one if either of two conditions hold: first, if pre-emptive rules represent the preferences of a substantial majority of contracting parties, or second, if the costs of transacting in
respect of choice of law approach zero. The less representative the rule, the
more savings on adjudicative costs will be offset by the sum of (a) the
transaction costs of parties who will contract around it for their preferred
rule, plus (b) the social costs of an
62 inefficient rule selection in cases where
parties do not contract around it.'
As is implicit in the previous paragraph, and of course in the Coase
theorem, 63 a rule that is not widely preferred will be irrelevant to efficiency
if the parties can costlessly transact around it by a choice of law clause.
However, transaction costs are so rarely zero that this proviso need not
trouble us much. Recall from Part II that there may be substantial social
costs if the contract is governed by an inefficient choice of law. There may
be an excessive amount of litigation and threats to breach the contract, litigation may be more costly,164 and risks may be assigned to those who will
bear them inefficiently.
The representativeness of untailored rules depends not only on the distribution of preferences but also on the form of pre-emptive rules. It is
likely that the approach taken by the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) in referring issues associated with formation to the lex loci contractus and those associated with performance to the lex loci solutionis, may be as good an
approximation as one is likely to get, should one require a rule that applies
to all contracts.
On the other hand, untailored rules also have disadvantages. They may
implicate two bodies of law rather than just one, which can create uncertainty, conflict, and unpredictability. Also, the sheer breadth of contracts to
which a generic rule must apply greatly increases the likelihood that it will
be unrepresentative.

162
See
63

Ayres, supra note 15.

1 Coase, supra note

19.

4For example, in international cases, the parties have to prove foreign law as a fact in a
local court. See generally Richard Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts, 108 L.Q. REv.

142 (1992).
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Although more costly in terms of rule formulation (that is, costly at the
time of the second order decision), transaction-type untailored pre-emptive
rules are more likely to reflect majority preferences. Thus, there would be,
where appropriate, different rules for products liability cases, 165 medical
negligence cases, industrial accidents, and so on. Professor Louis Kaplow
makes this point when arguing that complex rules can replicate the sophistication of some standards, even if simple rules cannot. 1 6 Transaction-type
rules continue to achieve lower first-order adjudication costs. However,
they have a disadvantage of their own. Because the rules will never be
collectively exhaustive or mutually exclusive, that is, there will always be
to evasion by characterizasome hiatuses and overlap, they
16 may be subject
tion of the nature of the case. T
If transaction-type untailored rules fail to reflect substantial preferences, lawmakers can respond either by making them of presumptive status
only or by moving towards more tailored forms of rule selection. So far as
presumptions go, our analysis suggests that a court should admit another
law than the one presumed to apply where the parties would have contracted in favor of it had they turned their mind to choice of law problems.
This might be indicated where express rovisions of the contract will be inHowever, if the presumption is
valid under one, but not another, law.
only applied to the cases where there is a marked superiority between legal
systems, it may be that there will in fact be few cases for it to actually apply. If one system has a marked superiority, one would expect the parties to
make a choice of law in its favor. After all, choice of law clauses are quite
frequently observed in agreements with multi-state features. If this is so,
passivity in adjudication may be the best response in many cases. 169 The
greater uncertainty arising from downgrading the rule to mere presumptive
status may not be worth the benefits.
This comment applies equally to the tailored methods. Let us first consider the most significant relationship test, which we called semi-strong
tailoring above. 170 It is important to note that while closest connection tests
involve a degree of tailoring, they assume a strong correlation between jurisdiction and preference, i.e., that where parties' contracts are most closely
connected with jurisdiction 3, they prefer J's law. 17' This is surprising for a
tailored method. If preferences vary, or if jurisdictions supply substantially
165Not every products liability case need be the same either. For instance, if air disasters

are included in products liability cases, a place of the sale rule would be clumsy to use and
heavily reliant on formalisms. It may be best to use the law of the place of departure.
166See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 586-87.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 112-121.
168 See supra text accompanying note 54.

16 9 See generally Schwartz, supra note 13.
17TSee supra text accompanying note 53-54.
171See supra text accompanying note 55-56.
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inefficient rules, this assumption will be hard to maintain. Additionally, an
approach that is reliant on examining and balancing different types of connections must confront the fact that there is no systematic, unbiased means
of doing so. In other words, connections are incommensurable. 172 Judges
will implicitly resort to tie-breakers, such as preferences for forum law, to
resolve deadlocks. 173 As compared with untailored pre-emptive rules, we
believe "most significant relationship" tests are probably inferior. In simple
cases, they will mostly reach the same result. In complex cases where factors point in more than one direction, the commensurability problem implies that semi-strong tailoring does no better than a tie-breaker which is
known ex ante.
What of strong-form tailoring? Here, the court is not asking which jurisdiction is most closely connected. Rather, it is asking which legal system
would the parties be most likely to have contracted for. Ordinarily, in
longer contracts, parties will bargain for a cooperative outcome. There is
no need for courts to ask what the parties would have agreed to, because the
parties will probably end up agreeing to it by themselves. However, litigation may intervene to preclude a cooperative solution. Choice of law tailoring may be one way of remedying this, since it can simulate what the
parties would have agreed to had negotiations not broken down. Tailoring
may indeed be the only way this can be achieved, because the English
courts have been hostile to contingent, or "floating", choice of law arrangements.' 74 In these circumstances, there would be an asymmetry between a rule and a tailored standard. The tailored standard could be
excluded by an express choice of law, but a pre-emptive rule could not easily be excluded in favor of a contingent arrangement. 175 Thus, tailoring
rectifies the problem that contracts can be complete in the sense of specifying all their obligations, but they are insensitive to future states of the
world. That is, because circumstances change over time, rule preferences
172 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH.

L. REv. 779 (1994).
173 See, e.g., Coast Lines Ltd. v. Hudig & Veder Chartering N.V., [1972] 2 Q.B. 34, 44
("IT]here are sometimes cases where... [t]he circumstances... point equally to two countries, or even to three .... What is an arbitrator or judge to do? Is he to toss up a coin and
see which way it comes down? Surely not."). See also Atlantic Underwriting Agencies Ltd.
v. Compagnia Assicurazione di Milano S.P.A., [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 240,245.
174Floating choices of law do not lock in a choice of law at the time of the agreement but
provide a procedure for setting it at some later time. See, e.g., Rossano v. Manufacturers'
Life Ins. Co., [1963] 2 Q.B. 352, 362; Armar Shipping Co. v. Caisse Algerienne d'Assurance
et de Reassurance, [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 450, 455; Astro Venturoso Compania Naviera v.
Hellenic Shipyards S.A., [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 12, 15; Dubai Electricity Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 380, 385; Star Shipping A.S. v. China
National Foreign Trade Transportation Corporation, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 445. See also
Whincop & Keyes, ProperLaw ofthe Contract,supra note 43, at 539-42.
175See Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributionsof Easterbrook
and Fischel,59 U. CHI. L. RFv. 1391, 1403-06 (1992).
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change, too.
Untailored choices of law may induce costly renegotiation or
176
breaches.
This is an impressive argument on paper, but it may be unconvincing
in practice. For it to be significant in the context of market torts, it would
imply that the parties' demand for reasonable precautions, or for insurance,
would change over time. With the exception of industrial accidents, most
market torts do not contemplate long term relations between the parties.
Therefore, the need for tailoring to track longer term agreements will frequently be low. Even where contingent incompleteness is a substantial
problem, courts must be competent in analyzing the rules to which the parties would have agreed. Courts may not be so if the information required
for efficient gap-filling is unverifiable. 77 Finally, the discretion conferred
by tailoring may not be used to simulate party agreement but used instead to
further spurious, inefficient, or partisan objectives.7 8
Thus, we would argue that transaction-type, pre-emptive rules respond
best to the problems of tort choice of law rules. 7 First, they should set
clear benchmarks at the time of contracting, which would permit parties to
decide whether they want to remain with the default, or contract out of it.
Obviously, this requires that the basis of the rule is something both parties
will be able to recognize at the time of the contract. For instance, a consumer domicile rule in a products liability case would fail by this standard.
Second, in conjunction with procedural rules such as those we considered
above, they can economize on information costs. 80 Using one simple rule,
which is based on one or two factors known to both parties, reduces the
amount of information the parties need to acquire to ascertain the applicable
law, compared to the much broader inquiry needed under tailoring. If the
rule operates in a conventionally territorial manner, it will often reduce information costs with respect to legal rules, since conflicts issues can be substantially ignored in a majority of apparently domestic transactions. Parties
are not precluded from choosing foreign law where there are advantages,
but if this is to occur then the party proffering a choice of foreign law will
be obliged to bear the other party's information costs.
176 See Ayres & Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency, supra note 13, at 730. Tai-

lored choices of law may also be a means of overcoming possible status quo biases. See supra text accompanying note 128.
177 See Schwartz, supra note 13. See also Hadfield, supra note 15; Johnston, supra note

15.

17 8 See generally Brilmayer, InterestAnalysis, supra note 6, 395-96.
17 9 See Georges R. Delaume, The European Convention on the Law Applicable to ContractualObligations: Why a Convention?, 22 VA. J. INT'L. L. 105, 120 (1981); H. Matthew

Horlacher, The Rome Convention and the German Paradigm:Forecastingthe Demise ofthe
European Convention on the Law Applicable to ContractualObligations,27 CoRNELL INT'L.

L.J. 173,200 (1991).
' 8 See supra text accompanying note 154.
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Third, clearer rules will facilitate pricing in product markets and, depending on the selected tort rules, insurance markets. Fourth, they reduce
forum shopping incentives and should take less time to litigate. Fifth, simpler rules facilitate class actions. The court can reduce the extent to which
it must make individual findings on the lex causae applying to a class
member's transaction. 81 Thus, transaction-type, pre-emptive rules may be
optimal for market torts, where they are simple, where they are based on
criteria that are common knowledge, and where they correspond to the spatial locus of the market in which the transaction occurred. In Part IV, we
will demonstrate an example of the transaction-type, untailored pre-emptive
rule we would favor in products liability cases.
2. Mandatory Choice ofLaw Methods
Most of the advantages of transaction-type, pre-emptive rules continue
to hold even when the choice of law rule becomes mandatory. Parties and
markets still need the ex ante certainty that pre-emptive rules provide. The
only change is the effect of preference heterogeneity on the preferred form
of the choice of law method. Under a choice of law default, parties could
contract around the rule by a choice of law clause. By hypothesis, they
cannot do so here, irrespective of transaction costs. In theory, the parties
could attempt to take the transaction outside the criterion of operation of the
statute applying the tort rules.18 2 However, this form of exit is costly. We
believe that the optimal approach is to retain pre-emptive rules but to dilute
them to presumptions that are rebuttable where another jurisdiction is
closely connected with the transaction 18 3 and where there are sound reasons
to believe the parties would have contracted in favor of that system.
Presumptions are not an ideal solution because they may serve to protract litigation if one of the parties perceives the opportunity for private gain
should the presumption be rebutted. However, some flexibility in choice of
law is needed where preferences are heterogeneous and where contracting is
not permitted. Ex post tailoring takes the place of ex ante contracting. To
deal with opportunistic attempts to rebut the presumption, we would argue
that parties should be given the freedom to contract to confirm the application of the legal system selected by the choice of law presumption.

These last two points are recognized in the American Law Institute's Complex LitigaProject: AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS § 6.01 (1994). See P. John Kozyris, The Conflicts Provi181

tion

sions of the ALI's Complex Litigation Project:A Glass Half Full?, 54 LA. L. REv. 953, 962

(1994).
82

1 See supra text

accompanying note 143-145.
provides a limit on the number of options a court can be asked to consider, and so
reduces adjudication costs.
183 This
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3. Conclusion

Thus, an economic analysis of choice of law in market torts advocates
an approach to choice of law that will, in the first instance, defer to the parties' choice of law, subject to a suitable disclosure requirement. In other
cases, the law should set rules for each major transaction-type. Such rules
should be based on commonly known criteria and should reflect the preferences of a majority of contracting parties. These rules should apply preemptively in cases where contractual choice of law is permitted and where
it is not permitted they should apply presumptively. Presumptions should
be rebuttable if another jurisdiction is more closely connected with the
transaction and if there are sound reasons to believe the parties would have
contracted in favor of that system. The rule that is the subject of the presumption should in every case be capable of contractual confirmation by the
parties.
IV. APPLYING THE CONTRACTARIAN CHOICE OF LAW METHOD

One of the themes of Parts II and I is that information about the efficiency of markets and the nature of transactions that comprise them is essential to the analysis of choice of law rules. First, it is impossible to
determine whether there is a market failure that warrants restrictions on the
right to choose law contractually unless one defines and understands the
market. For example, it is likely that the possibility of market failure is
higher in cases of contracts between patients and heart surgeons than in the
market for consumer products. 184 It is almost certain that market failure is
more likely in either of those markets than in securities markets.
Second, we have advocated transaction-type untailored rules as the optimal default choice of law method. An understanding of the nature of
transactions and party preferences is crucial to establishing choice of law
rules that reflect party preferences. The following sections of this part are
not intended to be the final word in the rules that should apply to the market
torts we examine. Rather, they are intended to be a preliminary analysis of
rule-setting in each area and a review of the issues raised by relevant theory
and scholarship.
We first examine products liability cases. Here, we find that there may
be a case against direct contractual choices of law, though this is far from
certain. We then examine the resolution of choice of law issues in securities litigation. We argue, consistently with other commentators, that these
cases should be assimilated with the choice of law rules applicable to the
internal affairs and governance of the issuing corporation. In effect, we regard incorporation as a matter of direct choice between the parties to corpo8
1 4 See

generally Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of
the Ill: A Critiqueof the InsuranceTheory of Compensation,79 VA. L. RIv. 91 (1993).
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rate contracts, and therefore this choice should be enforced in all matters
arising from those contracts.
A. Products Liability
1. ContractualChoices ofLaw
Should the law permit a manufacturer and a buyer to subject their tort
rights to an agreed choice of law? This question is very similar to another
vexing dilemma: whether liability rules applicable to products cases should
be subject to contract.1 5 Professor Landes and Judge Posner argue that
contracting may often not be an efficient solution to liability because the information costs associated with generally low accident risks may swamp
the benefits from contracting. 116 They echo the finding of Professors Alan
Schwartz and Louis Wilde that a market can function well, even if some
consumers are poorly informed, if the market clears at prices that reflect the
presence of other, well informed consumers. 187 However, there may only
be a small fraction of consumers with any feel for product risks.1 88 Even if
consumers' perception of average product risks are accurate, manufacturers
will have no incentive to provide quality that is greater than consumers' average valuation. Unless this problem can be controlled in some other way,
such as by reputation, it will cause high quality manufacturers gradually to
drop out, with the ultimate result being the unravelling of the market. 8 9
Professor Schwartz takes a different view.' 90 He points out that the
case for enforcing contracts depends on three things. First, consumers must
know the content of their contracts. 19' Not enforcing contracts is not the
best means to achieve this. Procedural means such as disclosure and plain
English requirements may be a better solution. 192 This is consistent with
our analysis of the law's procedure-settling functions.
Second, consumers must know the alternative terms offered in the
market and must opt for the terms they prefer. 193 While Professor Schwartz
', 56 See supra text accompanying note 28.
11 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 18, at 280-82.
187 Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information:A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979).
'88 See Shavell, supra note 18, at 54-55, 61-62. See also Beales et al., supra note 152, at
502.
'89 See Mark Geistfeld, Manufacturer Moral Hazard and the Tort-Contract Issue in
ProductsLiability, 15 INT'L. REv. L. & ECON. 241 (1995).
190Schwartz, supra note 34.
'191
ld. at 372-73.
92
This was our argument regarding choices of law: it is better to require their effect to
be disclosed than to deprive parties of the right to agree to them. See supra text accompanying notes 154-156.
193
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 373.
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recognizes that comparison shopping is probably limited, firms will profit if
they satisfy significant preferences for contract terms.
Scholars critical of law and economics are naturally skeptical of these
two claims. 194 That there may be an economic basis for this intuition has
been demonstrated by Professor Avery Katz. 195 Professor Katz analyzes
contracts in which the buyer places value on aspects of the exchange which
she cannot costlessly evaluate. These include the quality or the risk of the
goods as well as warranty and contractual provisions. The problem for the
buyer is that after she incurs the cost of investigating these aspects of the
contract, that cost will cease to be relevant to her decision to enter that contract. Thus, reading the contract terms will not change the reservation price
that bounds the contracts she will accept had she not investigated them.
Thus, the seller will want to offer terms that put the buyer in the position of
wanting to accept the contract, but only just.196 The buyer who reads will
be in the same position as the buyer who does not read, but the former will
wish she had not incurred the cost of doing so. Therefore, in equilibrium,
buyers will not read, and sellers will offer low quality terms. It follows that
we should not be too ready to credit an argument that says consumers will
opt for the contract terms they like if they cannot be expected to know what
the terms are.
Professor Katz acknowledges that sellers may profit by offering higher
quality terms where consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality,
but this will depend on sellers being able to make information regarding
this attribute of the contract available to buyers at very low cost.' 97 This
might be done with a specific requirement to bring the matter to the consumer's attention, as we have argued in the choice of law context. 98
Third, Professor Schwartz notes consumers must perceive risks correctly and appreciate the effect on risk of product alterations. 199 He argues
that there is no theoretical or empirical reason to believe that consumer estimates err systematically in one direction or the other. 00 Much behavioral
research over the last two decades shows that human decision-making is
often substantially flawed, because of the tendency to use informal heuristics to analyze risks.20 ' These heuristics may lead to overestimation or un194 See the discussion of contracts of adhesion, supra text accompanying note 151.
195 See Katz, StrategicStructure,supra note 155, at 272-93, and Katz, Your Terms, supra

note96155, the former article being a non-technical analysis of these issues.
1 Katz, Strategic Structure, supra note 155, at 286-87.
' 97
1d. at 288.
98

1 See supra text accompanying notes 155-156.
199 Schwartz, supra note 34, at 374-78.
2
0OId. at 378-82. See also Shavell, supra note 18, at 54.
201
The pathbreaking work in this area is by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemann. See
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristicsand Biases, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). For reviews of this
literature and assessments of its relevance to legal policy, see Ward Edwards & Detlof von
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derestimation based on, for example, the vivid or bland nature of the risk.
Failures of rationality need not be uniform across all transactors. Repeat
transactors may be more accurate than one-time transactors.202
So while the case for contractual choices of law is not compelling,
neither is the case against it, since the predictions of behavioral economic
theory are not sufficiently tractable to use for policy-setting in this area.20 3
This dilemma is compounded by the fact that the problem arises in a private
international law context in which accepted doctrinal approaches admit either all or no contractual choices of law. Intermediate positions are possible, but by and large these require statutory sanction, because courts are in a
poor position to regulate which contractual choices they will enforce and
which they will not.2 ° Courts lack the necessary information to undertake
that task. Unless there were some form of coordination among courts as to
the standards applied in order to judge whether the choice of law should be
enforced, forum approaches would become fractured and divergent. Variation in these "substantive" choice of law rules would increase the amount of
forum shopping, which was one of the very problems to which contractual
choices of law were thought to offer a solution. Choice of law problems
would begin anew.
All of this implies that courts should adopt a passive approach to the
enforcement of contracts not prohibited by legislation, or at least adopt the
same approach to choices of law as they do in "pure" contract cases. Given
that much U.S. legislation now leaves substantial issues of tort liability and
third party insurance to contract, 205 a similar approach in tort law would at
least have the (minor) virtue of consistency. So far as statutory solutions
go, perhaps the simplest response would be to prohibit contractual choices
of tort law in consumer contracts, while leaving business purchasers with
the ability to make their own choices.20 6
Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implicationsfor the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225
(1986); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REv. 211 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailtyto RationalActors:A Critique of ClassicalLaw and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989);
Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998); Korobkin, supra note 128. But cf Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral
Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (criticizing behavioral economics
for lacking predictive power and inaccurately caricaturing the concept of rational choice in
modem economics).
202 Thus, the Rome Convention provides that different rules regarding choices of law
should
apply to consumer contracts. ROME CONVENTION, arts. 6, 7.
203
It might be added that even if there are relevant market failures, their costs must be
offset against the seriously dysfunctional choice of law method that currently applies to market 2torts.
04See Schwartz, supra note 34, at 378.
205
See supra text accompanying note 28.
2
06See supra text accompanying note 202. But cf William J. Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of
Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf Between "Consumer" and "Nonconsumer" Con-
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2. Choice of Law Defaults in ProductsLiability

Our analysis of choice of law for products liability cases substantially
follows our general analysis of choice of law defaults in part III.B. The optimal products liability default is a pre-emptive rule, while the optimal
mandatory rule is a presumption, each selecting the law of the place of sale
to the consumer. This recommendation, it may be recalled, was anticipated
by Professor McConnell.2 °7

A place of sale rule reduces information costs, for it minimizes the
amount of information about legal rules that buyers need to have. Unless a
buyer goes to the trouble of buying products abroad, such as by the Internet
or by mail-order, a private international law issue should simply not arise.
The buyer will not need to acquire further information about foreign legal
rules and can assume that, in the absence of a choice of law being disclosed
and explained, local law will apply. The rule enables the seller to decide
whether to distribute its product within a given jurisdiction, based on its
markets and potential legal exposure. Although some manufacturers may
not have direct control over their product distribution, it seems most practical to make manufacturers bear the risk, given that they have lower transaction costs than buyers in making arrangements regarding final markets with
the distributor.
A place of sale rule in practice is not perfect. It will not produce uniformity in rights in mass products liability litigation that involves buyers
from multiple states. 20 8 It is thus perhaps less of a high-low strategy when
there are multiple plaintiffs. However, there are no perfect rules in that
situation. If one adopts rules that compel mass torts to be resolved by a
single law, one will either destroy ex ante predictability or, at least, increase
the information costs to consumers of acquiring information about the liability rules governing their contract. One simply cannot have it both ways.
Given the other advantages of a place of sale rule, and the fact that mass
tracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 243 (1997). In fairness, though, it must be added that
legislatures have often failed specifically to address the question of the impact of private international law issues on products liability legislation. See Stuart Dutson, International
ProductsLiability Litigation: The TerritorialApplication of Part VA of the Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth) and Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK), 22 MON. U. L. REv.
244 (1996); P. John Kozyris, Choice of Lawfor ProductsLiability: Whither Ohio?, 48 OHIo
ST. 207
L.J. 377, 377 (1987).
McConnell, supra note 100, at 98. See also O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 102, at
769-70; Harvey Perman, ProductsLiabilityReform in Congress: An Issue ofFederalism,48
OHio ST. L.J. 503, 508 (1987); Brilmayer, Rights, supra note 6, at 1307-08. But cf P. John
Kozyris, Interest Analysis Facing its Critics - And, Incidentally, What Should Be Done
About Choice of Law for Products Liability?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 583-85 (1985) (advocating place of intended use where mutually known, otherwise place of delivery).
208
For instance, the A.L.I.'s Complex Litigation project is intended to ascertain a choice
of law rule which will permit mass torts by the law of a single state. See Complex Litigation
Proposal, supra note 181, § 6.01(a).
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torts are a rare event for any single consumer, the place of sale rule seems a
reasonable compromise.
Another practical difficulty with a place of sale rule is that the place of
sale may not always be apparent. For example, take a case in which a buyer
litigates with respect to a product such as a drug, from which she suffered
adverse effects as a result of long-term administration. What happens if she
has moved between jurisdictions during the period in question?209 Of
course, such issues are no easier to resolve using the locus delicti, which
engrafts an added layer of complexity regarding duties to warn. Few rules
giving10 certainty at the time of the contract will be completely certain ex
2
post.
B. Securities Litigation
Choice of law problems are also presented by litigation brought by investors in corporate securities against the officers of a corporation, professionals (such as auditors and underwriters) retained by the corporation, and
the corporation itself. n Such lawsuits fall into two categories. In one
category are suits that allege a common law cause of action, such as negligence by the auditor in the audit of financial statements included in a disclosure document used in capital raising. Australia and England have seen
much litigation of this sort.2 2 In the second category are suits based on a
cause of action deriving from a statute regulating securities. The twentieth
century has seen extensive legislative regulation of securities market conduct including disclosure and fundraising 21 3 In federations such as Austra-

lia and the United States, where this statutory law has been promulgated by
the federal government, conflicts can occur only on an international basis,
not on an intra-national basis.214 However, with increasing intemationali2

09See

2 10

Gottesman, supra note 63, at 43.

See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 37-42

(1995).
211Why consider securities litigation in an article on torts? First, some securities litiga-

tion alleges common law negligence. See infra text accompanying note 212. Second, like

other tort rules, the provisions in securities regulation statutes tend to be mandatory. Third,
the A.L.I. Complex Litigation choice of law proposal may apply to them, according to the
Introductory Note to Chapter 6 and the comments in § 6.01. See Complex Litigation Proposal,
supra note 181.
21
7See, e.g., Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 App. Cas. 605; Columbia
Coffee & Tea Pty Ltd. v. Churchill (1992) 29 N.S.W.L.R. 141; Esanda Finance Corporation Pty

Ltd.21v.
Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 C.L.R. 241.
3
See, e.g., SecuritiesAct of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994 & Supp.); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78m (1994 & Supp.); CorporationsLaw (Cth) Parts
7.1121and 7.12; FinancialServices Act 1986 (U.K.).
4

However, that is not completely true of the United States, as all states have securities
legislation, and state legislation may be emerging from a long desuetude. See Mark A. Sargent, A Futurefor Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 471, 504-05 (1993).
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sation of securities markets, these issues are important to the efficiency and
integrity of global finance.
A preliminary issue is whether these issues are amenable at all to the
contractarian theory of choice of law that we have described. When the defendant is a professional retained by the corporation, there is no direct contractual chain between the parties as there is between consumer and
manufacturer. However, economic analysis can explains the provision of
audits or other forms of disclosure by a company offering its securities.215
In Coasean terms, investors value the verification of company information
and would be prepared to pay for it because it is relevant to security returns.
There are barriers to their doing so, in that a producer of information can
rarely capture all of its benefits. However, the company, which can provide
the verification information most cheaply, will profit if it does so since investors will pay more for these securities. Thus, the audit commissioned by
the company reduces the third party costs of information and transacting.
In the case of other types of rights asserted against officers and the
corporation itself, contractual analyses are appropriate afortiori. The economic analysis of corporate law has demonstrated that the corporation is a
nexus of contracts. That is, officers, shareholders, creditors, employees and
others have contractual relationships with each other. The corporation is
simply a nexus of these related contracts.2 16 Thus, a contractarian approach
is a very appropriate to the analysis of choice of law issues raised by securities litigation
We have said above that the optimal choice of law rule for a given type
of transaction must flow from a study of the transaction's market context.
An important aspect of securities markets is that the transaction cost of
trading is typically very low. For most transactions, securities can be reduced to their risk-return properties, giving them a uniquely high degree of
substitutability.2 17 These features give securities markets a high degree of
efficiency in the response of securities prices to new information. One of
the consequences of efficient, low cost markets is that territoriality concepts
wither. It matters not at all that the investor bought her Black, Inc. securities in Tokyo, or in Sydney, or in New York. Low transaction costs mean

215

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 280-83; Ross L. Watts & Jerold L.
Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 613

(1983).
2t6
The concept of the company as a nexus of contracts was first described in Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs

and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). The definitive synthesis of
that217
proposition with corporate law scholarship is EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13.

Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market:The Tortured Transition of Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud,49 U. MiAMI L.

REv. 671, 679-81 (1995).
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that price differentials persist only very briefly before they are eliminated

by the effects of arbitrage.2 18
These features affect the optimal choice of law rule. Rights must be
constant across all those who invest in a corporation's securities.2 19 Place
of sale, the basis of the choice of law rule in the United States, 220 is a
meaningless datum in the context of a securities market. The place of the
wrong would be a highly impractical rule because of ascertainment difficulties, especially when a corporation has multinational or indeed cyber-

spatial operations.2 21

The best choice of law rule is one that selects the law of the place of
incorporation.2 22 The place of incorporation is used in common law countries to resolve conflicts regarding the corporation's "internal affairs", such
as shareholders' rights and governance issues.2 23 It has formed the basis of
jurisdictional competition for incorporations in the United States. Despite
218

On the efficient capital markets hypothesis, see generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient

CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory andEmpirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Eugene F.

Fama,Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991). For application of the theory to
legal scholarship, see generally Ronald A. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of

Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information and SecuritiesResearch, 60 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761 (1985);
Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and SecuritiesRegulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851 (1992); Lynn Stout, The UnimportanceofBeing Efficient:
An Economic Analysis ofStock Market PricingandSecuritiesRegulation, 87 MICH. L. REV.

613 (1988). See also Jolls et al., supra note 201, at 1485-86 (referring to the importance of
arbitrage
to rational behavior in a market).
219

See P. John Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of Multistate Takeovers - ControllingChoice of Law Through the Commerce Clause, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499,

509-11 (1989) (stressing the need for uniformity across investors); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359,

2403-04
(1998) (same).
2 20

§ 414, 7B U.L.A. 672 (1985).
Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small
Business CapitalFormation,2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 41 (1998).
222Where incorporation occurs under state legislation but securities regulation has a subUNIFORM SECURITIES ACT,

221

stantially federal basis, this rule would select the securities law of the federation of which the
state was part. If federal regulation ceases to pre-empt the state's right to regulate, the rule
would exclude state securities regulation. Competitive models of securities regulation are
proposed in Romano, supra note 219, and in Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the Reach ofInternationalSecurities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L.
REv. 903 (1998).
223 LAWRENCE A. COLLINS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1109-13
(12th
ed. 1993); SYKES & PRYLES, supra note 51, at 398-99; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971). For critical analysis of the difference between the U.K. and U.S.

choice of law approach and the approach in European Union states other than the United

Kingdom, see generally David Chamy, Competition among Jurisdictions in Formulating
CorporateLaw Rules: An American Perspective on the 'Raceto the Bottom' in the European
Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 423 (1991); R.R. Drury, The Regulation and Recognition
of Foreign Corporations: Responses to the 'Delaware Syndrome', 57 CAMB. L.J. 165

(1998).
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much criticism, 224 empirical evidence indicates that such competition has
value to shareholders.125 However, the rule does not apply to all corporate
affairs. The characterization process would refer rights asserted in tort to
tort choice of law rules. Rights arising from securities regulation are most
commonly referred to the law of the place of the transaction.226 As we have
seen, these rules are inappropriate.
The advantages of applying the internal affairs rule to shareholders'
rights in tort are that, first, it provides a simple rule which minimizes information costs. Shareholders only need to know the company's place of incorporation. In making judgments that depend on applicable liability rules,
corporations need only consult a single body of law, and they need not concem themselves with the exchanges on which shareholders buy shares.
Second, it provides a single body of law for all of the rights a shareholder
asserts. This makes for consistency between the rights forming the corporate contract between shareholders and managers and the tort rights shareholders assert against other defendants. 227 Third, the rule has the effect of a
contract between shareholders and managers regarding the future provision
of information and disclosure. Shareholders know that they will be able to
enforce the laws of the place of incorporation. Promoters and managers can
give a credible commitment abut the quality of future information. Fourth,
this predictability facilitates the pricing of shares. Because incorporation in
a jurisdiction is a credible way to lock in the application of laws, the quality
of these laws should be reflected in the price of securities offered by the
au
221
The value of the corporation will be maximized by choosing
corporation.
the jurisdiction with the best corporate and securities laws.
Professor Romano has used this argument to advocate the devolution
level. 229
of securities regulation authority from the federal level to state
Professor Romano's argument further advocates a right for a corporation to
select a securities domicile which could be separate from the place of incorporation.230 This approach uncouples securities law from other corporate
224

The most influential critique is William Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). But cf Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
ShareholderProtection,and the Theory ofthe Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
225See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle, I
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product]; Roberta Romano,
CorporateLaw and CorporateGovernance, 5 IND. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 313-30 (1996);
Romano, supra note 219, at 2383-88. See also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
an Interest-Group Theory ofDelawareCorporateLaw, 65 TEx. L. REv. 469 (1987).
Toward
226
See supra text accompanying note 220; UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 414, 7B U.L.A.
672227
(1985).
These include rights conventionally thought of as relating to internal affairs, and those
relating
to securities regulation.
228
See Romano, Law as a Product,supra note 225.
229
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law, potentially permitting greater choice. It would also be the logical requirement if the federal government is to become a competitor with the
states as a place of securities domicile, unless the federal government is also
to become a competitor for incorporations.
It will be noted that so far we have only advocated a single solution:
apply the law of the place of incorporation. Since every corporation must
be incorporated somewhere, this contractual solution cannot conceivably
involve gaps in the choice of law. Hence, unless there is some reason to
believe it to be inappropriate to govern securities litigation choice of law issues by the state of incorporation, there is no need for a choice of law default. Is there a relevant market failure that would make these choice of law
rules inappropriate? The usual reaction to market failure has been advocacy
of federal law. 23 1 Even if securities legislation purports to apply extraterritorially, a foreign forum, if not a domestic one, must still make a judgment
on which law to apply.2 3 2 Yet federal law cannot change the fact that international cases still raise choice of law issues.233
There is no reason to believe that an internal affairs rule would discriminate against out-of-state investors. Nothing would compel them to invest in out-of-state securities. They could instruct brokers not to invest in
foreign corporations. Since securities are so readily substitutable, investors
would still have a substantial amount of choice among investments.23 4 Brokers and exchanges, among others, would be likely to serve as intermediaries or "gatekeepers", which would allow investors to reduce the costs of
obtaining information about different regimes.2 35 In terms of its uniformity
and predictability, the place of incorporation rule is far superior to other
conceivable rules.
This section has shown how a contractarian approach to choice of law
in market torts might be applied to analytically complex torts and tort-like
causes of action. As is clear from our conclusions, a single choice of law
rule cannot be recommended because the appropriate method depends on
relevant aspects of the market and the nature of contracts formed therein.
Thus, in products liability cases we embraced territoriality, but we rejected
it in securities litigation cases. Likewise, in products liability cases, we expressed doubt about enforcing the chosen law, but we affirmed the place of
231
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incorporation, as the product of corporate contracts, in securities litigation
cases. This approach is one which looks for answers not in theories of private international law or state sovereignty, as do vested rights or interest
analysis, but in theories of transacting and property rights. Thus, it is a theory which extends theories of the substantive law areas of tort and contract
to multistate contexts, not a theory which grafts a freestanding theory about
conflicts onto substantive law areas. It therefore offers a more principled
and more reliable means of pursuing legitimate policy goals.
V. CONCLUSION

In this article, we have examined the relationship between tort and
contract at the theoretical level to give a normative analysis of the relationship they should have at the conflictual level. We also demonstrate how
conflictual issues can be analyzed in terms of the legal and economic theory
examining the form of legal rules, and the first- and second-order strategies
that are adopted to resolve legal problems. Private international law must
draw on these literatures if its scholarship is to drag itself out of the "dismal
swamp" its doctrine is often described as inhabiting.236
Real world contracts are incomplete, and choice of law has a role in
selecting the jurisdiction which supplies rules to fill those gaps. However,
both English and United States tort law choice of law rules are inherently
unsuitable as gap-filling methods in securities market tort cases. We have
also argued that the rule selecting the law which has the most significant
relationship to the contract or the tort may not be appropriate, either. These
problems are exacerbated by the characterization process. We have argued
that the primary norm of contract choice of law methods - selection of the
lex causae by express choice of law - should be embraced as a presumption in contract cases, but that this presumption should be rebuttable on
grounds of market failure. Market failure will very rarely be a generic phenomenon, and remedying it is thus better suited to legislative intervention
than to judicial activism. It requires study of particular market contexts. It
may exist in product markets, but is much less likely to exist in investment
markets. Likewise, contract theory is very helpful in constructing choice of
law methods that should apply in the absence of choice.
An important part of our analysis has been to show how different rules
affect the time at which adjudication costs are incurred. The natural advantage of a choice-enforcement rule is that it transfers the costs to the parties whose information on their preferences should be superior. In cases
where choice-enforcement is not appropriate, we have generally argued in
favor of high-low methods, which select choice of law rules appropriate to
transaction-types. These should attempt to satisfy party preferences, they
should be based on criteria that are common knowledge, and they should
6

23William

Prosser, InterstatePublication,51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953).

269

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

19:215 (1999)

minimize the length of adjudication and the variation among awards across
forums.
Our argument, however, will not go uncriticized. Most conflicts scholars will see this as a return to vested rights, in effect if not in theory. We
have subscribed to the same multilateralist goals - uniformity across forums, certainty, and predictability. We do not feel ashamed that we do so.
Unlike most proponents of interest analysis, we see private international
law in general, and choice of law rules in particular, as an uninspiring font
of justice. Scholars have been told many, many times that the tort system is
prohibitively expensive in delivering compensation compared to first-party
insurance and social security.
Some scholars, such as Professor Juenger, will criticize us for reverting
to an approach likely to expose plaintiffs to the tort reform statutes he regards as the product of special interest groups.23 7 He maintains that the
conflicts revolution has not been about interest analysis but about the recognition of the need for flexibility to avoid bad substantive laws. Even if
one were to ignore crises in products and insurance markets, such a method
presupposes that we want more, not less, judicial activism, and that we can
find judges who can combine those activist tendencies with sufficient sagacity to be able to recognize better laws. Professor Juenger, in preferring
to resolve problems such as mass torts by substantive (i.e., federal law) solutions rather than conflictual solutions does not recognize that interest
groups will prefer a federal substantive solution because it is much harder
to avoid.238 Our solution, by contrast, takes interest groups seriously, embraces exit strategies, and asks judges to leave their activist tendencies to
law review articles.
A more serious criticism is that by adopting a transaction-type approach to the law, we open up some scope for a new sort of characterization
problem. The choice between transactions becomes an escape device. That
this may happen on occasions is likely, but so what? If there are radical differences between the potentially applicable laws, parties are likely to make
a choice of law if they are permitted to do so. If the differences are relatively minor with regard to the underlying risk, the efficiency effects will be
minor, too. It takes no special skill to think of a case that creates a problem
for a rule. In terms of the behavioral theory discussed in this paper, academic rationality is severely bounded, because our perceptions are biased
by an availability heuristic - we read too many exceptional cases and not
enough routine ones.239
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To close this essay with a view towards future research, we emphasize
how important empirical research should be to the future of policy-based
conflictual research.2 40 Much remains to be done in examining how parties
in the real world deal with choice of law issues. Is there a status quo bias,
and if so how strong is it? Is commercial arbitration a solution that parties
prefer as a superior means of dispute resolution or simply as a better alternative than forum biases and judicial incompetence? What differences are
there in the resolution of contractual problems in long term relations compared to faceless mass-market transacting? Do more cases settle under rulelike choices of law than standard-like ones? These questions will provide a
platform on which to model theoretically the impact of legal rules, and provide either endorsement or criticism of assumptions about choice of law.
We hope to have assisted in the formulation of those research questions.
One day we hope to see them answered.
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